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Mixed integer programming (MIP) maximizes (or minimizes) a linear
objective subject to a set of constraints. In particular, one of the constraints
for a MIP is that at least one of the variables can only take integer values. This
technique has been widely studied in operations research and a MIP can be
solved efficiently by commercial solvers. In this dissertation, two power system
problems namely, an interdiction problem and a unit commitment problem,
are formulated and solved with MIP techniques. The studies presented in this
dissertation focus on extracting the special features embedded in the problems
and formulating the problems such that they can be solved using the available
MIP techniques.
The objective of an interdiction problem in a power system is to find
a set of the most critical or vulnerable components to secure and reliable op-
eration. Before formulating the problem, we need to study the outages and
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their impacts in power systems in depth. Once a critical component of a power
system fails, the outages including generator and load trips can sequentially
spread and frequently lead to large blackouts. The efforts to develop a model
to analyze cascading outages is first summarized. Reports about cyber at-
tacks on the Ukraine power grid revealed that one or more malwares were
deliberately developed to attack industrial facilities, with power systems as
one of the major targets. Another potential cyber threat to secure operation
of power transmission grids involves Internet of Things (IoT) demand attacks.
Increasingly, Internet connections are available to devices with high energy
consumption such as air conditioners and water heaters. However, these new
connections expose the control of new electric loads to potential manipulation
by attackers. To help assess the effects of cyber attacks, we develop numerical
experiments and define different types of cyber attacks to simulate Ukraine-
style cyber attacks and IoT demand attacks to study the system responses in
a North American regional interconnection system. Based on the studies in
cascading outage analysis and cyber attack simulations, an interaction prob-
lem between a defender (e.g. system operator) and an attacker (e.g. terrorist)
in a power system is formulated as a MIP and a “short-term” impact of an
attack is considered using a cascading outage anylsis (COA) tool. A demon-
strative case study with an existing method is presented and numeric studies
with “short-term” impacts with COA model are ongoing.
The unit commitment (UC) problem in a power system is another MIP
problem. UC determines the start-up and shut down schedules of generat-
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ing units to meet forecast demand in a short term future (few hours to few
days). It is critical to precisely represent the generating units in a UC prob-
lem to maximize the social welfare, which is the objective of the problem.
The formulation of two types of unit namely, combined-cycle gas units and
pumped-storage hydro units in a UC problem are presented in this disserta-
tion.
In recent years, combined-cycle units (CCUs) have been operated as
providers of flexibility needed due to the increasing shares of renewables. Con-
sequently, optimization models have been proposed to determine the configura-
tion of CCUs. However, most of the existing models assume that any transition
between configurations finishes in a single interval. This assumption is often
violated in reality, as a transition might last up to a few hours during which the
CCU has limited dispatchability. In this work, a mixed-integer programming
formulation that represents the transition ramping of CCUs is summarized
and the formulations of ramping constraints are discussed. Numerical studies
are performed on an illustrative test system and a Mid-continent Independent
System Operator (MISO) system.
As one of the mature technologies for energy storage, pumped-storage
hydro is able to provide services in a time range from minutes to days. Partic-
ularly, pumped storage hydro units are useful for enhancing the integration of
renewable generations that are naturally intermittent. Optimization models
have been proposed to determine strategies to dispatch a energy storage unit
in the system. However, most of existing work assumes the output from a
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energy storage unit is continuous. This assumption is not true for a pumped
storage hydro unit. Inspired by the work of modeling a combined cycle unit
in the unit commitment problem, this work proposes a configuration based
pumped storage hydro model that removes the invalid continuous outputs as-
sumption in order to enhance the use of pumped storage hydro resources in
the system. By introducing three “configurations,” namely, pumping, gener-
ating and “alloff” or off-line, for a pumped storage hydro unit, the proposed
model can more accurately reflect the practical operations of pumped storage
hydro units in the day-ahead market. A comprehensive review of the existing
pumped storage hydro models and industry practices is presented. The def-
inition of configurations of a pumped storage hydro unit and the transitions
between the configurations during operation are revealed and discussed in de-
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This dissertation is organized as follows. The first part of this disserta-
tion is focused on power system interdiction problems. The details of cascading
outage analysis (COA) models are discussed in Chapter 2. The framework of
the COA model and the designs of different checkers are presented. Examples
are demonstrated. Different cyber attacks on power systems are discussed in
Chapter 3. The implementation of the COA model and simulation results in
the North American regional interconnection case are included. The model
and knowledge learned in these two chapters are applied in a power system in-
terdiction problem that is formulated as a mixed-integer programming (MIP)
model in Chapter 4.
The second part of the dissertation focuses on a typical mixed-integer
programming problem in the operation of a power system – the unit commit-
ment problem. The unit commitment (UC) problem determines the start-up
and shut down schedules of generating units to meet forecast demand in a
short term future (few hours to few days). It is critical to precisely represent
the generating units in a UC problem to maximize the social welfare, which
1
is the objective of the problem. In Chapter 5, a transition ramping model is
summarized based on a configuration-component hybrid combined cycle gas
unit model. Ramping constraints are discussed and computational studies are
presented with a Mid-continent Independent System Operator (MISO) system.
In Chapter 6, a configuration based pumped hydro unit model is formulated.
An illustrative case study is shown, while further study on the MISO system
will be conducted as future work.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses
cascading outages in a power system. Section 1.3 introduces cyber attack sim-
ulations on power systems. Section 1.4 presents a formulation and techniques
to solve a power system interdiction problem considering “short-term” effects.
Section 1.5 and section 1.6 discusses the formulation of two different genera-
tion units, namely, a combined-cycle unit and a pumped-storage hydro unit,
in the power system unit commitment problem.
1.2 Cascading Outages in Power System
Many large blackouts have occurred across the globe, such as the 2003
Northeastern America Blackout [377] and the 2012 India Blackout [281]. It
is noticeable that during the 2003 Northeastern America Blackout, 14 high
voltage transmission lines tripped out within 5 minutes. The blackout also
caused 61,800 MW of load lost. Over 50 million people were without power
in northeast US and Ontario, Canada and an estimated monetary cost of 6-
10 billion US dollars is reported. Many of these large blackouts are caused
2
by a consecutive series of various outages, or cascade, following an initial
disturbance. Some major blackouts in North America due to cascading outages
are shown in Table 1.1.
The practice in electric system design and operations has considered the
N-1 security criterion [91]. The North American Reliability Standards require
that the “transmission system is operated so that instability, uncontrolled
separation, or cascading outages will not occur as a result of the most severe
single contingency and specified multiple contingencies” [90]. However, when
multiple, simultaneous or near simultaneous contingencies occur, the outages
including transmission line, generator, and load trips can sequentially spread
and lead to large blackouts [381].
Nevertheless, it is very difficult to identify critical components that
represent weaknesses in the power system and to analyze cascading outages
due to the lack of detailed blackout data and complicated electrical-physical
interactions. In this work, we propose an improved outage checker based
cascading outage analysis (COA) algorithm to simulate the potential cascading
outage of the system.
1.3 Cyber Attack on Power System
Based on the further developed cascading outage analysis tool, two
types of cyber attacks on power systems are studied in this work. The first
type of cyber attack targets power grid control centers. Once the cyber at-
tackers have access to the power grid control system, an attack could blackout
3
Table 1.1: Examples of Cascading Blackouts in North America (Source: data is






Nov. 9, 1965 Northeast 30 million 13 minutes
July 13, 1977 New York City 1 million 1 hour
Dec. 22, 1982 West Coast 12,350 MW Few Minutes
Dec. 15, 1994 Western U.S. 9,336 MW N/A





55 million Few Minutes
Sep. 8, 2011 Southwestern U.S. 7 million Few Minutes
a regional power system and may trigger cascading outages and cause large-
scale load losses. The second type of cyber attack targets consumers that have
high-energy consumption loads and potentially could interrupt the system op-
eration by manipulating the compromised load. These types of attacks are
described in the next two sections.
1.3.1 2015 Ukraine Cyber Attack
On December 23rd 2015, a regional electricity distribution company
in Ukraine reported service outages to customers. The outages were due to
a third party’s illegal access into the company’s computer and Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Forensic investigations re-
4
vealed that a malware named BlackEnergy had infected the SCADA systems
after a successful attack. Seven 110 kV and twenty-three 35 kV substations
were disconnected for three hours. Later it was revealed that three different
such distribution companies were attacked, resulting in several outages that
caused approximately 225,000 customers to lose power across various areas in
Ukraine [326]. On December 17th 2016, a second power outage occurred in
Ukraine and deprived part of its capital, Kiev, of power for over an hour. Al-
though the official investigation is still ongoing, an assessment was made that
a more advanced malware, Industroyer, was used in the second cyber attack
against the power grid in Ukraine [1].
On May 11, 2017, President Trump signed an executive order to strengthen
the cyber security defenses of federal networks and critical infrastructure. In
the executive order, there is a section that specifically addressed the threats
from “electricity disruption and prolonged power outages resulting from cyber
security incidents.” Incident responses have been carefully studied and a sub-
stantial set of cyber requirements has been placed on all U.S. grid operators
of bulk power grid for several years [284]. On October 19th 2017, the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) proposed new mandatory cybersecu-
rity controls to address the risk posed by, for example, smaller grid control
centers that are typically less critical than major control centers, but which
are nonetheless vulnerable to intrusion software [354].
Power system vulnerability under cyber security threats has also been
studied previously in the engineering literature. Ten et al [371] proposed a
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vulnerability assessment framework for a systematic analysis incorporating
both power and cyber systems of the control networks. Chen et al [73] built
a real-time cyber physical test bed that simulates the communication system
and power system simultaneously.
A typical assumption in this literature is that the cyber attackers have
full or partial control of the SCADA systems. For example, Xuan et al [240]
solved a bi-level linear programming problem to study the effects of a cyber
attack on the system economic operation cost. These methods only considered
partial effects of a cyber attack on power systems. For example, Xi et al [430]
proposed a model to investigate the cascading failures in a smart grid consisting
of a power grid and a coupled cyber network. In [430], they studied cascading
sequences of transmission overloading. However, there are other protection
actions such as generator over- and under-frequency that may contribute to
the cascade that were not considered in [430].
Thus motivated, for the purpose of developing a tool to assess the ef-
fects of cyber attacks, we propose a method to simulate the power system re-
sponses under cyber attacks using a cascading outage analysis model that con-
siders generator tripping under rotor angle and system frequency deviations,
under-frequency and under-voltage load shedding, and overload protections
on branches. The emphasis of this study primarily involves adapting a previ-
ously developed cascading outage analysis (COA) tool to simulate the effects
of cyber attacks. We implement the tool in a planning case of a North Amer-
ican regional interconnection system. The initial cyber attacks are modeled
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as simultaneously opening circuit breakers associated with various categories
of devices in each transmission and distribution company (owner) in the in-
terconnection system. Our results show different features of system responses
under different cyber attacks.
1.3.2 IoT Cyber Attack
The vulnerability of Internet of Things (IoT) devices is a well-known
problem [8, 111, 328]. An IoT cyber attack has become a concern to power
system operators recently since more and more devices with high-energy con-
sumption such as water heaters and air conditioners can be controlled by con-
sumers through the Internet. Although manipulating the energy consumed in
a single household is not enough to cause any major problem to the power
grid, a recent paper presented in USENIX Security 2018 [361] proposed the
Manipulation of demand via IoT (MadIoT) attacks, and showed an attacker
who could coordinate the compromise of hundreds of thousand of high-energy
IoT devices to launch several attacks on the power grid, including (i) frequency
instabilities, (ii) line failures, and (iii) increase in operating costs.
In this work, we perform an in-depth study of the power grid effects
of MadIoT attacks using the COA tool. Our analysis shows that while Ma-
dIoT attacks can create negative consequences on the power grid, the negative
impact on the grid will not be as serious as originally claimed in [361]. In
particular, while some load shedding may be necessary to deal with these at-
tacks, our results show that creating a system blackout–which would a require
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black start period of several days to restart the grid—would be very difficult,
given the embedded protections that all power systems have throughout their
infrastructure.
1.4 Power System Interdiction Problem
Based on our knowledge learned from cascading outage analysis and
cyber attacks studies, an interdiction problem between a defender (e.g. system
operator) and an attacker (e.g. terrorist) in a power system is formulated as
a mixed-integer programming (MIP) problem. A “short-term” impact of an
attack is considered and discussed with the cascading outage anylsis (COA)
tool.
The electric system is designed to satisfy the N − 1 security criterion,
which means the system could lose any one of its N components (such as gen-
erators, transmission lines) and continue operating within emergency limits.
However, when multiple, simultaneous contingencies occur, the system might
experience various stability problems, which might lead to the large cascading
events. Outages are typically caused by storms or other extreme weather con-
ditions but could also be carried out deliberately by knowledgeable attackers
with little risk of detection. Furthermore well-planned and coordinated at-
tacks by terrorists could leave the electric power system in a large region of
the country at least partially disabled for a very long time [95].
In [338], an interdiction problem is formulated as a bi-level mixed-
integer programming problem. A decomposed heuristic algorithm was devel-
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oped. Salmeron et al. [339] introduced Global Benders Decomposition (GLBD)
to solve the same problem described in [338] and observed improved conver-
gence toward the optimal solution even with a non-linear, non-convex sub-
problem. The key advantage of GLBD over a single level MILP formulation
is that the algorithm’s subproblems represent simple, familiar instances of the
primal linear program OPF. Thus, the user need not maintain a problem that
involves unfamiliar constructs from the dual of the OPF model that are compli-
cated by interactions with binary variables as in Mixed-Integer LP procedure
in [276] and as in the KKT method to solve the subproblem described in [428].
To better represent the “short-term” system responses to an attack, the
COA model that analyzes both transient and steady state system responses to
a contingency is incorporated as a sub-problem in the interdiction framework
in [398] in addition to DC-OPF used in [338] and [339]. Because of the non-
linearity brought by COA model, the problem in [398] is solved through a
heuristic method that is similar to the algorithm in [338]. A key question is
whether the GLBD method might also be successful for the problem in [398].
In this dissertation, the efficiency of the application of the GLBD
method on the bi-level system interdiction problem with DC-OPF as the sub-
problem is first demonstrated. Then the GLBD method is applied in the
problem with COA model incorporated as the sub-problem. The test systems
are built on a PowerWorld 7 bus OPF case and a PowerWorld 37 bus system
with transient stability data and generic costs for OPF.
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1.5 Combined Cycle Unit Formulation
Unit commitment (UC) problem in a power system determines the
start-up and shut down schedules of generating units to meet forecast demand
in a short term future (few hours to few days). The objective of a UC prob-
lem is to minimize the total generation costs; that is, to maximize the social
welfare. Unit commitment decisions (binary variables) and unit dispatch lev-
els (continuous variables) are determined. Also, a large set of operational
constraints has to be satisfied. Therefore, the UC problem is a complex op-
timization problem that can be formulated as a mixed-integer programming
problem.
There are new features in electricity markets that may involve formu-
lation modifications and potentially add computational complexity to the UC
problem. One such new feature is the participation of combined cycle gas
power plants. A combined cycle power plant has a combination of gas and
steam turbine units. The exhaust heat from a gas turbine is used by a steam
turbine to generate more electricity. Combined cycle units (CCUs) have higher
efficiency, lower CO2 emission, better flexibility and faster response. There-
fore, there is an upward trend of installing combined cycle units [201], [52].
Consequently, optimization models have been proposed to determine
the configuration and operation of CCUs in the electricity market. However,
there are assumptions made in existing models that are often violated in reality.
In this work, we will first address a one interval transition assumption made in
the existing models. A mixed-integer programming formulation that represents
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the transition ramping of CCUs and removes the invalid assumptions of one
interval transitions is proposed in [181]. We build on [181] by incorporating
a set of configuration-wise ramping constraints into the transition ramping
model. Numerical studies are performed on a MISO system.
1.6 Pumped Storage Hydro Unit Formulation
Pumped hydro plants use power to pump water uphill to an elevated
reservoir when the electricity price is low. The water is released to a lower
reservoir and drives the turbine to generate electricity when it is needed. There
are now about 38 pumped storage plants in the United States. As one of
the mature technologies for energy storage, pumped storage hydro is able to
provide service in a time range from minutes to days. The services in this time
range include spinning reserve and load or generation shifting. Therefore,
pumped storage hydro units can be used as a flexible energy management
tool and it is particularly useful for enhancing the integration of renewable
generations that are naturally intermittent.
Inspired by the work of modeling a combined cycle unit in the unit
commitment problem, this work proposes a configuration based pumped stor-
age hydro model for the day-ahead market, in order to enhance the use of
pumped storage hydro resources in the system. By introducing three “config-
urations,” namely, pumping, generating and “alloff” or off-line, in a pumped
storage hydro unit, the proposed model can more accurately reflect the prac-
tical operations of pumped storage hydro units in the day-ahead market. A
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comprehensive review of the existing pumped storage hydro models and indus-
try practices is presented. The definition of configurations of a pumped storage
hydro unit and the transitions between the configurations during operation are







Cascading Outages in Power Systems
2.1 Introduction
1 Cascading outages is the main mechanism of large blackouts, and the
duration of the sequence of cascading events can be very short so that there
is little time for operator intervention. In the 2003 North-Eastern America
Blackout [377], 14 high voltage transmission lines were tripped out within 5
minutes. In order to evaluate the short term impacts of a particular attack,
the amount of short-term load shed should be calculated. Many efforts have
been put into research to identify the cause of these events and the methods
to mitigate them. Eppstein et al [119] has developed a Random Chemistry
algorithm to identify the multiple contingencies that initiate cascading failure.
Hazra et al [164] proposes pattern recognition and fuzzy estimation to calculate
the cascading sequences of an event. Jie Chen et al [75] introduces a hidden
failure model with an embedded DC model to study the cascading dynamics
1Bing Huang, Mohammad Majidi and Ross Baldick, “Case Study of Power System Cy-
ber Attack Using Cascading Outage Analysis Model,” 2018 IEEE Power Energy Society
General Meeting, Portland, OR. Mohammad Majidi contributed in advising on the design
of Cascading Outage Analysis (COA) Model and the techniques in programming used in
this paper. Ross Bladick contributed in advising the design of Cascading Outage Analysis




These methods are either very computationally expensive, or do not
very accurately represent the system behavior after the initial disturbances. In
several cases, these methods explicitly model initiating events that are “nat-
ural” or caused by equipment failure, rather than initiating events that are
deliberately chosen to cause damage, as is the main focus of our research.
Thus motivated, we developed an improved outage checker based algorithm to
simulate the potential cascading outage of the system. While our approach is
also computationally intensive, it is directly aimed at modeling the effects of
deliberate large-scale attacks. Some previous work on developing sequential
outage checker based Cascading Outage Analysis (COA) is presented in [190]
and [396]. In this chapter, we provide an improved COA model, more de-
tailed and accurate preventive equipment modeling, and a case study using a
PowerWorld test system.
2.2 Framework of the COA
In previous models [190], [396], the cascading outage analysis is per-
formed with sequential application of the checkers. This sequence is applied
based on assumptions about the timing of various system protective actions
subject to different criteria. For example, it is assumed in the previous mod-
els that the transient stability protection will detect rotor angle instability
and trip generators before Under Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS) activates.
The frequency relay will deploy UFLS before the over current relays trip the
15
overloaded components, and over current relays will act before the under volt-
age relays trip out the loads or generators that experience voltage instability.
However, in practice, the time of potential relay actions for the frequency re-
lays, over current relays, and voltage relays could overlap. Once an element is
tripped out (i.e., the line tripped out by the fastest relay), the system topol-
ogy is changed accordingly, which will induce a sudden change of the power
flow. The elements that were not tripped out will experience different loading,
and could then be tripped by subsequent protective action. Therefore, in the
improved COA developed here, simultaneous application of protection is mod-
eled by the checkers and more detailed models of each protection scheme are
implemented to provide a better representation of the sequence of the cascade.
We ignore the possibility of operator intervention between outages, under the
assumption that events occur too rapidly for an operator to handle.
The analysis starts from a specification of the initial disturbances. Then
the transient stability or rotor angle stability is checked by the Transient Sta-
bility Checker (TSC). If the generator rotor angle is larger than a certain
threshold, say, 100 degrees, the generator will be automatically tripped. At
the same time, the frequency at each bus is checked by the frequency outage
checker (FOC). If the frequency at a bus deviates from from the nominal fre-
quency of 60 Hz to be outside the range (e.g. 57.6 Hz to 62.4 Hz) for longer
than a minimum time threshold, then the generator connected to this bus will
be tripped. If the frequency at a load bus drops lower than some predefined
thresholds for longer than a minimum time threshold then a percentage of the
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total loads connected to this bus will be shed. After any of these actions, the
analysis goes to the next cascading stage involving analysis with the TSC and
FOC. If the system reaches a transiently stable state, the COA activates the
two other checkers (overload outage checker or OOC, voltage outage checker
or VOC) simultaneously. Each checker is implemented with a relay function
to return a potential trip time. Then the COA determines the first element to
trip (if any). If the topology changes, the COA will come to the next cascading
stage and start the transient stability checker and frequency outage checker
again. The workflow diagram is shown in Figure 2.1.
2.3 Design of the Transient Stability Checker (TSC)
Transient stability, or rotor angle stability, is the ability of the power
system to remain in synchronism when subjected to large transient distur-
bances [218]. According to [250], the power system dynamic behavior can
be represented as a set of differential equations (2.1) and a set of algebraic
equations (2.2).
ẋ = f(x, y) (2.1)
0 = g(x, y) (2.2)
where x represents electromechanical state of the power system and y repre-
sents control inputs. Both x and y are implicitly functions of time.
A disturbance in the network usually requires a change to both the net-
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Figure 2.1: Work Flow of the COA
work configuration and boundary conditions. These are modeled by changing
the coefficients in the functions appearing on the right-hand side of (2.1) and
(2.2).
In the context of transient stability under disturbances, the distur-
bances may include faults on transmission elements, loss of load or loss of
generation. Notice that typical “natural” faults on the transmission elements,
which are normally short-circuits, if cleared and re-closed successfully, should
not result in physical destruction of the assets [421]. This is very different from
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the physical attack aimed at damaging the facilities or cyber attack targeted
at taking control of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) sys-
tems, since permanent damage or intended opening of breakers with a denial
of service attack, could contribute to long-term impacts on the system.
Transient stability analysis has been performed in power system analy-
sis by many methods. Studies in [422] and [115] use time-domain simulation to
calculate the exact system response in time by implicitly numerically integrat-
ing the differential equations (2.1) and solving the algebraic equations (2.2)
at each time step. The time domain simulation is the most accurate method,
but is slow in computation and does not provide any measurement of degree
of system stability.
Other approaches include transient energy function (TEF) and poten-
tial energy boundary surface (PEBS) [141], [70], [83]. These methods avoid
numerical integration by constructing energy functions and comparing the
system energy at the time when the fault is cleared to a critical energy value
estimated by the energy functions to determine whether or not the system will
remain stable. These methods are fast in computation compared to the time
simulation, and also able to provide useful information regarding the degree
of stability or instability. However, they are only applicable to power system
stability models having energy functions, and are not as accurate as numerical
integration. Hybrid methods [252] combine the numerical integration and the
energy functions method.
We use time-domain simulation to perform the transient stability as-
19
sessment because of its high accuracy. The time-domain simulation allows
taking into account the full system dynamic model and consists in checking
that inter-machine rotor angle deviations lie within a specific range of values.
Different models have been used to represent different dynamic charac-
teristics of the generator. In our simulation, a “GENROU” model is selected to
represent the round rotor generator. It is noticeable in [320] that the GENROU
model provides a very good approximation of the behavior of a synchronous
generator. More than two-thirds of the machines in the 2006 North American
Eastern Interconnect case are represented by GENROU models. Additionally,
standard “IEEE T1” exciter model is used to represent a brushless alternating
current (AC) exciter with a rotating rectifier, and “IEEE G1” governor model
is used to represent the governor response model. However, we observe that
data for these models may not be readily available publicly because of data
security issues (see Section 3.2.1).
The transient stability checker uses the PowerWorld transient stability
solver to numerically calculate the system response after a fault. If the rotor
angle deviation of a generator is bigger than a certain threshold (e.g. 100 de-
grees), then the generator will automatically be tripped. The implementation
of transient stability enables the Cascading Outage Analysis (COA) model
to include transient stability assessment (that is, it analyzes the rotor angle
stability problem), and hence provides a more accurate representation of the
system behavior [421].
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2.4 Design of the Frequency Outage Checker (FOC)
If there is a mismatch between the generation mechanical power and
the net-load, then a frequency excursion will occur. The frequency excursion
may then trigger the over- or under-frequency protection. To represent this
possibility, the frequency outage checker (FOC) is designed to model the pro-
tection behavior against system over or under-frequency events. In previous
work [421], a system frequency response (SFR) model [14] was used as a fre-
quency response model. In the model, nonlinearities and all but the largest
time constants in the equations of the generating units of the power system
are neglected, with the added assumption that the generation dynamics are
dominated by reheat steam turbine generators.2
Since the latest PowerWorld transient simulation includes models for
generator over- under- frequency relay and under frequency load shedding
relays, the frequency checker can be embedded in the transient simulation and
use the PowerWorld transient solver to calculate the frequency response of
disturbances. It adds two advantages to the model. First, actual frequency
response is used by relays instead of system wide approximation while the
computational efforts are not significantly increased since we are running the
PowerWorld transient simulation for rotor angle stability anyway. Second, as
it is part of the transient analysis, if the protection relay takes any action, the
2With increasing capacities of gas turbine and combined cycle gas turbines, this as-
sumption is not literally true in, e.g. ERCOT. However, the resulting second order model
for frequency may still be a reasonably accurate representation if it is calibrated to actual
behavior.
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58.9 - 59.3 270 5 %
58.5 - 58.9 30 15 %
58 - 58.5 2 25 %
below 58 at least 2 Approval of ERCOT
impact of that action on transient analysis is automatically considered.
There are two protections implemented in the frequency checker, namely
Over/Under Frequency Generator Tripping (O/UFGT) and Under Frequency
Load Shedding (UFLS). If the frequency at a bus deviates from a predefined
threshold for more than a threshold time period, the generator connected to
that bus would be tripped, and a certain percentage of load connected to the
bus will be shed. A default configuration of PowerWorld O/UFGT and a con-
figuration of ERCOT UFLS are shown in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 respectively.
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2.5 Design of the Overload Outage Checker (OOC)
Line overloading for violating thermal limits is an important and com-
mon measure to identify the mechanism of cascading outages and to assess
vulnerability to cascading outages [397]. In a cascading outage scenario perti-
nent to line overloading, a line outage can cause increased flows on other lines,
potentially leading to overloading of these other lines. As a result, when a line
violates the thermal limit, it may be tripped.
It usually takes more than a few seconds for an over-current protection
to trip an over-loaded line because of the deliberate time delay built into
over-current relays; therefore we use steady-state power flow results to trigger
over-current protections. For steady state analysis, we used the PowerWorld
Simulator to solve the AC power flow. The status and dispatch set point of
units from transient analysis are used as a starting point for AC power flow.
Based on the result of AC power flow, we would first consider the transmission
over current protection.
A normal inverse-time over-current model described in Siemens SIPRO-
TEC 5 Current Relay [355] is implemented in our model. The time when the







where Ith is the current threshold value of the relay, and Tp is the setting value
of the relay. Both values are set by the relay operator. The current I is on
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the monitored component such as a transmission line or a transformer. The
value of T in (2.3) determines when the protection operates.
The normal inverse current relay characteristic is shown in Figure 2.2.
Note that in some cases a sag of a transmission line may result in a short
circuit to other objects, e.g. a tree, which would result in a much faster trip
due to distance protection actuation. This phenomenon was observed in 2003
North America blackout [377]. We are not modeling this issue in the COA.
Figure 2.2: Normal Inverse Current Relay Characteristic. [355]
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2.6 Design of the Voltage Outage Checker (VOC)
Another typical character of cascading outages includes under (or over)
voltages. When the system is highly stressed, the voltage profiles of power
systems may decline. Similar to the line outage checker, when a voltage profile
for a bus violates a pre-defined threshold chosen to maintain system stability,
the voltage outage checker (VOC) may activate. If a bus voltage stays below
the lower limit during the VOC process although the power flow calculation
converges, load shedding action may be taken to maintain bus voltages within
limits [397].
A standard Inverse time characteristic model described in ABB RXEDK
2H Time over/under voltage relay [2] is implemented in voltage relay model-
ing. The time that under or over voltage relay trips the element is determined













where k is the inverse time constant, parameters U oth and U
u
th are the over/under
voltage relay pick-up values respectively. The voltage U is the monitored bus
voltage. The values of T in equation (2.4) and equation (2.5) determine when
the protection operates. The inverse voltage relay characteristic curve is shown
in Figure 2.3.
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Figure 2.3: Normal Inverse Current Relay Characteristic [2].
2.7 Case Study of COA
Before a detailed discussion of the case studies in this paper, we clarify
the terms of Load Shedding and Blackout used in this section and Chapter 3
indicating the results of the simulations.
When some load is disconnected by under frequency load shedding
(UFLS), the customer in the relative small load region will experience a tem-
porary loss of electric power that can be quickly corrected once the system is
taken to a stable state. For example, load could be restored within 30 minutes
or an hour. UFLS is therefore nowhere near as serious as a complete system
blackout. When a complete system blackout happens, all the customers in
the system will lose their electric power from the system and it typically takes
several days to restore the system and the power supply to its customers.
The proposed improved COA model is demonstrated on a PowerWorld
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Figure 2.4: 37 Bus System and the Targeted Lines.
37 bus test case [301] for the purpose of illustration. An application of COA
to a large system is presented and discussed in Chapter 3. In our simulation,
transmission line and transformer MVA limits are set relatively tight in order
to illustrate the cascading scenarios. The cascading outage analysis (COA)
tool has been built in python 2.7.13 [383] in order to make it easier to connect
to other model or software such as PowerWorld simulator [320]. The AC
power flow calculations and the numerical integrations of the transient stability
checkers are based on the PowerWorld simulator results.
Figure 2.4 shows the topology of the PowerWorld 37 bus test system.
The initial disturbances that are highlighted by the red boxes in the figure are
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tripping transmission lines MORO138-LAUF138-1, BUCKY138-SAVOY138-1,
SLACK345-JO345-1, SAVOY138-JO138-1 and LYNN138-JO138-1.
Figure 2.5: Generator Rotor Angle.
Figures 2.5 to 2.8 display simulation results of system responses after
the initiating disturbances triggered at 1 second. These four figures present
the simulation results of, respectively, generator rotor angle, bus frequency,
branch current, and bus voltage corresponding to the four checkers. It can
be observed from Figure 2.5 that rotor angle at each generator converges to a
new value after some swings caused by the initial disturbances, which occur
simultaneously at time equal to 1 second. In Figure 2.6, after the disturbance
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at 1 second, the frequencies at all buses deviate from 60 Hz and gradually settle
at the end of the simulation. Notice that, since the rotor angle deviations at all
generators are within the limits and the frequency at each bus has not reached
any thresholds, there are no actions from TSC and FOC. In Figure 2.7 and
Figure 2.8, similar to rotor angle, the current and voltage start to settle after
a few seconds of fluctuations. The red horizontal line in Figure 2.7 indicates a
threshold value for OOC. Therefore, observed from the figure, because of the
violation of the OOC threshold, OOC will start to calculate tripping time for
two transmission branches.
Figure 2.6: Bus Frequency.
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Figure 2.7: Branch Current.
The real power flow on branches calculated by AC Power Flow are
shown in Figure 2.9. The green circles with green crosses inside are the tripped
lines during the initiating disturbances. The red arrows and red circles indicate
the overloaded transmission lines or transformers consistent with Figure 2.7.
The number in the red circle tells how much the element is overloaded by a
percentage of its MVA limit.
As a result from OOC and VOC, the transmission line highlighted in
the red box in Figure 2.9 LAUF69-HALE69-1 has the shortest tripping time
(27.8 sec). Therefore, transmission line LAUF69-HALE69-1 will be opened
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Figure 2.8: Bus Voltage Magnitude.
and thereby this becomes the 2nd disturbance to the system. Notice from Fig-
ure 2.5, that by 27.8 seconds, the transient variations will die out and each of
the variables will reach a steady state. Hence, the transient simulation with
TSC and FOC start to run with the 2nd disturbance and an updated system
topology from a steady state again depicted in Figure 2.10. The initial con-
ditions for this transient analyses correspond to the state just before tripping
transmission line LAUF69-HALE69-1.
The transient simulation results of rotor angle and frequency are pre-
sented in Figure 2.10a and Figure 2.10b. First, in both figures, we can observe
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Figure 2.9: Steady State Reached After the Initiating Contingency.
that the 2nd disturbances happens 27.8 sec after the end of the initiating tran-
sient simulation. We expect, for large systems, that the shortest tripping time
from overload and voltage protections will significantly exceed the transient
simulation time. Therefore, the accumulation of overload time that occurs
during the transient simulation is ignored. After the lines are tripped, the
generator rotor angles and bus frequencies start to deviate from their original
values. In Figure 2.10a, after 37.8 sec, rotor angle of five generators indicated
by four lines (there are two generators connected to one bus and thereby rep-
resented by one line) go up very rapidly. Between 38.97 sec and 38.99 sec,
these five generators are tripped by TSC since the magnitudes of their rotor
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angle deviations are larger than the predefined threshold.
(a) Generator Rotor Angle
(b) Bus Frequency
Figure 2.10: Simulation Results of the Cascading Contingencies
As a result, in Figure 2.10b, at 38.99 sec, the frequency of buses started
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to drop quickly as marked by the horizontal red arrow. This frequency drop is
due to the sudden loss of generators in the system. The frequencies at buses
keep decreasing and at 40.48 sec and 41.12 sec, respectively, the frequencies
have dropped below two thresholds for enough time so that the FOC activates
the Under Frequency Load Shedding twice. At time 41.12 sec, 45% of the to-
tal load in the system is shed. After the second load shedding, the imbalance
between generation and load in the system is relieved a little bit and the fre-
quencies stopped decreasing at 41.6 sec. However, before the frequencies reach
to a steady state, at 42.35 sec, highlighted by the red circle, 4 more generators
are tripped by FOC because the bus frequencies stay below the lower threshold
of the generator frequency protection for longer than a predetermined period
of time. At the same time, all 9 generators in the system are disconnected
which means the system has no power generation, a blackout happens, and
the simulation stops.
2.8 Conclusion and Future Work
In this chapter, a cascading outage analysis model (COA) is proposed
and illustrated in a case study of a small test system. The model provides a
way to evaluate the short term impacts of an attack, e.g. the amount of short-
term load shed. The COA model applies four outage checkers, namely Tran-
sient Stability Checker, Frequency Outage Checker, Overload Outage Checker,
and Voltage Outage Checker to simulate the system behavior after an initial
disturbance, i.e. an attack.
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Building on previous work [397], we enhance the COA model further.
First, we write the cascading outage analysis model with an open source lan-
guage - Python. After moving to Python, the COA model is easier to connect
to other models or other software. Second, the previous model was only semi-
automated, needing a human to manually specify outages as a result of an
attack. The current COA code is fully automated and can directly read ini-
tiating events from a database, modify the case study and run transient and
steady state analysis. Third, we add the frequency checker (as under and over
frequency protection relays) into the transient analysis. It gives two advan-
tages to the model namely actual frequency response is used by relays instead
of system wide approximation, and since it is part of the transient analysis, if
the protection relay takes any action, the impact of that action on transient
analysis is automatically considered.
The cascading outage analysis has several limitations. Potential im-
provements include:
• The cascading outage analysis model does not consider breaker fail-
ures and back-up protection schemes such as zone-2 and zone-3 pro-
tection. The future work may include these models to reflect the
real-world scenarios.
• The cascading outage analysis model uses a set of predetermined pa-
rameters and settings for protection devices. In the industry applica-
tions, different coordinations and settings among various protection
schemes may lead to different system behavior.
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• There are some control schemes in the power systems, including con-
trolled islanding schemes and automatic tap changers, etc that are
not modeled in the cascading outage analysis tool. These sophisti-
cated models could be incorporated and studied to make the simu-
lation results more reflective of reality.
Given the ability to simulate the potential cascades, a natural next step
is to develop a tool to analyze the effects of attacks on power systems. Recently,
cyber attacks have been a security concern of power systems operations and,
potentially, can cause large scale disturbances in the system. In the next
chapter, these issues are studied.
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Chapter 3
Cyber Attack on Power System
3.1 Introduction
1 2 Two types of cyber attacks on power systems are discussed in this
chapter. The first type of cyber attack targets power grid control centers. Once
the cyber attackers have access to the power grid control system, an attack
could blackout a regional power system and may trigger cascading outages
and cause large-scale load losses. The second type of cyber attack targets
consumers with high-energy consumption and potentially could interrupt the
system operation by manipulating the compromised load.
Reports about cyber attacks on the Ukraine power grid revealed that
one or more malwares were deliberately developed to attack the industrial fa-
cilities, with power systems control centers as the major targets. Such cyber
1Bing Huang, Mohammad Majidi and Ross Baldick, “Case Study of Power System Cy-
ber Attack Using Cascading Outage Analysis Model,” 2018 IEEE Power Energy Society
General Meeting, Portland, OR. Mohammad Majidi contributed in advising on the design
of Cascading Outage Analysis (COA) Model and the techniques in programming used in
this paper. Ross Bladick contributed in advising the design of Cascading Outage Analysis
(COA) Model, the simulations using the COA, discussion of results and multiple revisions
of the paper.
2Bing Huang, Alvaro Cardenas and Ross Baldick, “A Study of the Impacts of IoT De-
mand Attacks on Power Grids,” 28th USENIX Security Symposium, Santa Clara, CA, 2019.
Alvaro Cardenas and Ross Baldick contributed in advising and discussion of IoT simulations,
polishing and revising the paper in multiple rounds.
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security threats have been considered and studied by the North American Elec-
tric Reliability Corporation (NERC) since at least 2012. Thus, the purpose of
the work described in this chapter is to develop a tool, of potential use to gov-
ernment entities, to assess the effects of specific types of cyber attacks that are
modeled on the Ukraine attacks. The previous chapter described the previous
work on a sequential outage checker based cascading outage analysis (COA)
model. In this chapter, we first apply this COA model to a North American
regional interconnection system model and perform case studies to simulate
analogous system interdictions assuming the cyber attackers gained full control
of the system. During the cyber attacks in Ukraine in 2015, attackers opened
breakers using Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems
in three distribution companies that they previously compromised. This is
the most intuitive way for cyber attackers to create power outages once they
have access to SCADA. To help assess the effects of such attacks, we further
develop the COA model and study the impacts of opening different types of
devices of each transmission and distribution company (owner) in the studied
North American regional interconnection system.
The vulnerability of Internet of Things (IoT) devices is a well-known
problem [8, 111, 328]. Previous work has demonstrated that various of IoT
devices from cameras to door locks can be compromised directly or through
their designated smart phone applications [135, 282]. Vulnerabilities of IoT
devices go beyond personal privacy and information security. For example,
the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack by the Mirai botnet compro-
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mised over six hundred thousand IoT devices and was able to affect multiple
websites and network infrastructures [15]. Recently, more and more devices
with high-energy consumption such as water heaters and air conditioners are
also enabling consumers to interact with them through the Internet. Although
manipulating the energy consumed in a single household is not enough to cause
any major problem to the power grid, a recent paper presented in USENIX
Security 2018 [361] proposed the Manipulation of demand via IoT (MadIoT)
attacks, and showed an attacker who could coordinate the compromise of hun-
dreds of thousand of high-energy IoT devices to launch several attacks on the
power grid, including (i) frequency instabilities, (ii) line failures, and (iii) in-
crease in operating costs. These attacks paint a dire picture of the security
of the power grid as they show that a 30% increase in demand trips all the
generators in the US Western interconnection and a 1% increase of demand in
the Polish grid results in a cascading failure with 263 line failures and affecting
86% of the load in the system.
In this chapter, using the COA model, we perform an in-depth study
of the power grid effects of MadIoT attacks. Our analysis shows that while
MadIoT attacks can create negative consequences on the power grid, the neg-
ative impact on the grid will not be as serious as originally claimed in [361].
In particular, while some load shedding will be necessary to deal with these
attacks, our results show that creating a system blackout–which would require
black start period of several days to restart the grid—will be very difficult,
given the embedded protections that all power systems have throughout their
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infrastructure.
3.2 The Design of Cyber Attack Experiments
There are certain limitations of the studies on power system cyber at-
tacks: first, the absence of accurate transient simulation data; second, the lack
of perfect fidelity of power flow model; third, the imperfect models of protec-
tion. The first limitation will be elaborated in section 3.2.1. For reasons of
confidentiality, the power flow model of the North American regional intercon-
nection system is not the real system case. As discussed in detail in section
3.2.2, we model the system protections in a way that approximates the system
response to the contingencies but do not try to replicate the real protection
configurations.
Because of these limitations, our results are indicative of the types
of outcomes that might result from attacks by terrorists but are not specific
predictions for a real system. The assumptions would reflect the sort of limited
information that might be gathered by a terrorist.
3.2.1 Transient Data
The power flow case available for investigation does not include tran-
sient data. Therefore, in order to implement the COA model, we assemble
the transient data (machine, exciter, governor) from IEEE standard 300 Bus
case. The generators in the IEEE 300 Bus system have 6 levels of real power
outputs, so we create a range of generation level with 7 intervals. Then, we
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considered each generator in the interconnection case in our study and locate
which interval its power capacity falls into and use the IEEE 300 Bus system
transient data of that interval to configure the generator in the interconnection
case.
For reasons of confidentiality, we were not able to obtain the actual
generator transient data, so we apply the above method to approximate the
system transient behaviors. With the approximated transient data, the gener-
ator rotor angles in the system are very sensitive to even single contingencies
indicating that the model is not reflecting how an actual system would behave.
However, some of these results still display some interesting insights that will
be shown and discussed in section 3.3.1.3.
3.2.2 Protection Configurations
There are two protections implemented in the transient simulation,
namely Over/Under Frequency Generator Tripping (O/UFGT) and Under
Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS). If the frequency at a bus deviates from
a predefined threshold for more than a specific time period, the generator
connected to that bus would be tripped, and a certain percentage of load
connected to the bus will be shed. The details of the protections are shown
in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. As discussed in Sections 2.5 and 2.6, since the cur-
rent and voltage responses in the system are normally slower than frequency
feedbacks, the Time Inverse Overload, Time Inverse Under Voltage Load Shed-
ding, and Time Inverse Over Voltage Generator Tripping are modeled in the
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steady state simulation. Both protections will calculate tripping times once
the current flow on branches or the voltage at buses exceed the thresholds. The
element (branch, generator, or load) with the shortest tripping time will be
tripped as the initial conditions for the next iteration of transient simulation.
The parameters of the steady state protection models described in equations
(2.3),(2.4) and (2.5) are shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Steady State Protections
Over Load Over Voltage Under Voltage
Threshold Ith = 2 × line limit [amps] U oth = 1.3 [pu] Uuth = 0.8 [pu]
Parameters Tp = 0.05 k = 0.5 k = 0.5
3.2.3 Cyber Attacks Target on Grid Control Centers
Based on the experience in Ukraine power system hacking events, we
present three types of experiments that simulate analogous attacks on each
transmission and distribution system provider (TDSP) in the system in turn:
1. Open all devices of that TDSP;
2. Separately open all branches in each of three different voltage levels
of that TDSP;
3. Open all generators and loads connected to the lines of that TDSP.
Although experiment 1 is the closest scenario to the Ukraine attack,
experiment 2 creates examples that apply when companies only own branches
at specific voltage levels or otherwise have control systems that are partitioned
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across voltage levels, while experiment 3 creates examples where the attack
targets the creation of supply/demand imbalance as well as removing trans-
mission and distribution capability.
Before detailed discussion of the case studies, we state two main as-
sumptions that we make about a cyber attack:
• Cyber attackers already have full and unlimited ability to control the
tripping of breakers, and
• Cyber attackers actions of tripping of breakers of a TDSP are simul-
taneous.
In this study, an “Algorithmic non-convergence” is deemed to occur if
the PowerWorld transient solver could not find a solution. This could happen
either after the initial contingency or in subsequent transient runs. In contrast,
“Convergence” case means PowerWorld was able to obtain a transient solution
after the initial contingency, and also that any subsequent runs of the transient
solver were completed.
Algorithmic Non-convergence is a proxy to a complete blackout oc-
curring; however, it should be recognized that the correspondence between
Algorithmic Non-convergence and blackout is not perfect. Convergence is a
proxy to the system staying energized, although some generation and load
could be lost.
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3.2.4 IoT Demand Attack
We state three main assumptions (in line with previous work) about
an IoT demand attack:
1. IoT attackers already have full and unlimited ability to control the
compromised portion of loads;
2. IoT attackers’ actions of increasing or decreasing of compromised
loads are simultaneous;
3. The portion of the system demand compromised by the cyber at-
tackers are evenly distributed at each demand connection point in
the transmission system.
The third assumption is a speculation about the scalability of an IoT
attack. For example, if the adversary is able to compromise one brand of AC,
they can systematically apply the attack to as many ACs as possible in the
target system. Thus, if the total energy capacity of all such ACs is 10% of the
system demand, this 10% of demand is likely to be spread to every demand
connection point in the transmission system.
3.3 Simulation Results of Cyber Attacks on Grid Con-
trol Centers
In this section, we present the simulation results and discussions of
experiments described in section 3.2.3. First, we would like to investigate what
types of initial attacks are prone to cause an algorithmic non-convergence to
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the system in section 3.2.3. Although convergence means that a complete
algorithmic non-convergence does not happen, there is still load shed in the
system. Therefore, we display the results of load shedding in the convergence
cases and discuss relations between the amount of lost load and the voltage
levels of the attacked lines in section 3.3.2.
3.3.1 Algorithmic Non-convergence Cases
A brief summary of the number of algorithmic non-convergence cases
in the experiments is shown in Table 3.2.





All Branches All Loads and
GeneratorsEHV HV MV
Results 9/231 6/66 9/99 0/55 3/214
The results in Table 3.2 show the number of algorithmic non-convergence
cases as a fraction of the total number of cases of each type. For example, in
the experiment to open all extra-high-voltage (EHV) branches, the results
6/66 indicates that in total there are 66 TDSPs with EHV lines, and if all of
the EHV lines of a given TDSP are opened, 6 cases of TDSPs would result in
algorithmic non-convergence. The ratio of algorithmic non-convergence cases
to total cases is the same for opening EHV lines and high-voltage (HV) lines.
It is zero in the experiment on medium voltage (MV) lines. Since EHV and
HV lines carry heavy power flow in the system, opening those high voltage
lines will result in very large changes in power flow, which has a greater poten-
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tial to overload other lines and precipitate a cascade. Similarly, opening such
high voltage lines would also tend to cause power imbalance locally or globally
and stress the system the most. Therefore, opening the lines of TDSPs that
have high voltage lines is more prone to cause algorithmic non-convergence. In
contrast, while opening MV lines may interrupt load, there is a smaller effect
on overloading other lines.
3.3.1.1 Open All Devices of a TDSP
Figure 3.1: Histogram of Algorithmic Non-convergence and Convergence Cases
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of the number of tripped devices for
both the algorithmic non-convergence and convergence cases. Here, “devices”
include generators, loads, lines, transformers, and capacitors. The compar-
ison between the distribution of the number of devices in algorithmic non-
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convergence cases versus convergence cases suggests the intuitive result that
algorithmic non-convergences are more likely to occur when TDSPs with large
numbers of devices have their devices removed from the system. Nevertheless,
algorithmic non-convergences occur even for some TDSPs that have a small
number of devices.
3.3.1.2 Open All Branches at a Particular Voltage Level of a TDSP
Figure 3.2: Average Pre-attack Flow vs Number of HV Branches Scatter Plots
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show the scatter plots of the average pre-attack
flow (vertical-axis) and number of branches (horizontal-axis) in each case. In
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the plot, each dot represents a simulation result from opening all the lines at
a particular voltage level for a particular TDSP. Algorithmic non-convergence
cases are the red dots, convergence cases are the green dots. The average pre-
attack flow is the average power flow on the branches before they are opened
in the contingency. These figures show the results of simulation without rotor
angle checker.
Figure 3.3: Average Pre-attack Flow vs Number of EHV Branches Scatter Plots
At both HV and EHV, it can be observed that there are thresholds in
the number of branches. This is consistent with the conclusion drawn from
Figure 3.1. In particular, an algorithmic non-convergence will happen if the
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number of branches in an initiating event is greater than the threshold.
When we include the rotor angle checker in the same experiment, in ad-
dition to the similar thresholds in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, the results show thresh-
olds on average pre-attack flow that result in algorithmic non-convergence.
This result indicates the importance of loading on branches before the attack.
Intuitively, the observation from the simulation with rotor angle is reasonable.
The more power flow is disturbed, the higher the probability that local power
imbalance would happen, and the more generators would be tripped because
of rotor angle deviation. Therefore, we would expect a qualitatively similar
result if more accurate transient data were available, although the details of
the number of tripped devices would be different.
3.3.1.3 Trip All Generators and Loads of a TDSP
In the experiment of tripping all generators and loads of a TDSP, there
are only three algorithmic non-convergences in the simulation results with no
rotor angle checker. The TDSPs in these three cases either have very large
amounts of generation relative to load, or vice versa. The algorithmic non-
convergence is primarily caused by the significant supply-demand imbalance
due to the initial contingency.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the results of tripping all generations and loads
of a TDSP when the rotor angle checker is included in the simulation. It can
be observed that the difference between generation and load lost is important.
In Figure 3.4, the vertical axis indicates how much load is lost in the initial
49
Figure 3.4: Tripping All Generation and Loads Scatter (Include Generator Rotor
Angle Checker)
contingency and the horizontal axis indicates how much generation is lost in
the initial contingency. In this case, we can see that above a certain level of
load and generation, all the convergence cases (green points) involve roughly
equal amounts of generation and load tripped. This result clearly shows that
the power imbalance caused by the initial contingency is critical to algorithmic
non-convergence in the system. The extreme case shown in the figure is that
the system converged when around 1000 MW of both loads and generations
are lost in the initial contingency.
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Figure 3.5: Tripping All Generation and Loads Histogram (Include Generator
Rotor Angle Checker)
In Figure 3.5, the horizontal-axis is the power imbalance caused by the
initial contingency calculated as the amount of generation minus the amount
of loads. The vertical-axis is the frequency occurrence. This histogram shows
how the algorithmic non-convergence and convergence cases distribute for dif-
ferent levels of power imbalance. The results show that the convergence cases
mostly occur when the differences between generation and load lost is small.
In addition, the frequency of algorithmic non-convergence (the red bars) on
the right is greater than the left. That is, in the case of creating energy imbal-
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ances in the system by tripping generations and loads, given the same level of
imbalance, tripping more generations are more likely to cause an algorithmic
non-convergence than tripping more loads.
3.3.2 Load Lost in Convergence Cases
Convergence cases are the cases in which both transient and steady
state simulation would have a feasible solution at the end of COA. As men-
tioned above, although convergence means that a complete algorithmic non-
convergence did not happen, there is still load shed in the system.
Figure 3.6 shows the lost load for the case of opening lines at a particular
voltage level of a TDSP. The vertical axis shows the amount of load shedding
at the end of simulation, and the horizontal axis is the sum of real pre-attack
flow on the branches that are attacked. We can observe that, at each of the
three voltage levels, the amount of load lost caused by opening the breakers of
a TDSP at a particular voltage level has a relatively linear relationship with
total pre-attack flow on the branches for that TDSP. In addition, the slope of
MV cases is higher than HV cases, and EHV case has the lowest slope.
This result suggests that the more pre-attack flow on the lines that
are attacked, the more load would be lost. In addition, attacks on MV and
HV lines are more effective than attacks on EHV lines in terms of creating
load lost. In many cases, because the lower voltage lines are close to the load,
the loss of those low voltage lines would directly disconnect loads, or lead to
overloads on lines that disconnect loads. In addition, since EHV lines are
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Figure 3.6: Load Lost of Open Branches in Different Voltage Levels
highly meshed, if the system does not face algorithmic non-convergence, the
loss of EHV pre-attack flow is easier to be handled by the remaining network.
Therefore, the loss of EHV lines is less likely to result in further load lost.
3.4 Simulation Results of IoT Demand Attacks
This section will first demonstrate the contribution of applying the
cascading outage analyzer to the study of IoT demand attacks with a relatively
simple but standard Western System Coordinating Council (WSCC) model
with 9 buses and 9 lines to compare our results with previous work. Then, a
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detailed study of IoT demand attack described in Section 3.2.4 on the large
study case described in Section 3.2 is presented. The settings for the frequency
protections are updated according to ERCOT operation guide [123] for the
study in this section:
Table 3.3: Over/Under Frequency Generator Tripping. Source: data is from Sec-











60.6 Hz 9 min 59.4 Hz 9 min
61.6 Hz 30 sec 58.4 Hz 30 sec
61.8 Hz or above 0 sec 58.0 Hz 2 sec
57.5 Hz 0 sec








59.3 Hz 5 % 0 sec
58.9 Hz 15 % 0 sec
58.3 Hz 25 % 0 sec
3.4.1 Demonstration of IoT Demand Attacks Simulations with a
Cascading Outage Analyzer
In order to understand the effect of an IoT attack on the grid, it is
important simulate the response of power systems to disturbances, and in
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particular, to include the existing power system protections. The Cascading
Outage Analyzer described in Chapter 2 is designed to provide such a sim-
ulation. This tool is used to update analyses in [361] using a higher fidelity
model.
3.4.1.1 The Need for Closed Loop Transient and Steady-State Sim-
ulations
Since the operation of a power system after a disturbance is a contin-
uous process from seconds to minutes and even a longer time frame, a closed
loop structure of the cascading outage analyzer can better approximate the
operations of the power system over those various time scales after a distur-
bance. As previously discussed, the results and states of the system after the
transient simulation are stored and set as the starting point of the steady state
simulations. The cascading outage generated from steady state simulations, if
there is any, will be used as the initial condition in the transient simulation
for the next loop.
Previous work in [361] considered transient and steady state simulation
as separate, and as a result, the transient impacts on generators and system
frequencies are not present in the power flow simulations. Therefore the predic-
tions of cascading outages can differ between the two simulations. Let us look
at an example to see a possible inconsistency between the prediction in [361]
and the COA model prediction, while emphasizing the significance of a closed
loop simulation to the analysis of cascading outages and IoT demand attacks.
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Figure 3.7: PowerWorld 9-bus system.
Figure 3.7 shows the WSCC 9-bus system considered by Soltan et
al. [361]. Consider an IoT demand attack that increases all loads by 15%
in the system. Assume an outage would happen on a line if the power flow
is over its rated capacity [68]. If the transient impacts of this attack are not
considered, the results from the steady-state power flow would indicate a line
outage between bus 7 and bus 8. The resulting line considered to be in outage
is highlighted with a red circle (with the number showing the percentage of
the rated capacity) in the top left corner in Figure 3.8.
However, because of the sudden load increase caused by the MadIoT
attack, load and generation are not balanced and the frequency of the system
will be affected. A frequency protection relay would disconnect a generator
from the system if the frequency of the system stays lower or higher than the
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Figure 3.8: Power flow results of 15% of load increase.
generator’s threshold values for too long in order to prevent permanent damage
to the generator. Figure 3.9 shows the frequency responses to the 15% load
increase by considering frequency protection relays on generators [361]. We can
see that the system frequency starts to decline after the attack starts (at time
equal to one second of the simulation). The frequency relays then disconnect
all the generators in the system two seconds after the frequency drops below
the threshold of 58 Hz. Therefore, the system is completely blacked out in
the transient simulation of the IoT demand attack. These transient stability
results are different from the steady state stability study, which identified only
one cascading line outage as discussed in the previous paragraph.
This is a motivating reason to include transient and steady state analy-
sis together in a single simulation. Because transient and steady-state simula-
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Figure 3.9: Frequency responses to the 15% of load increase in the transient
simulation.
tions are connected in a closed loop in our model, the transient solution at the
end of the simulation time will be used as initial condition for the steady-state
power flow simulation. In this example, if the under frequency load shedding is
not considered, which will be discussed in subsection 3.4.1.2, the transient so-
lution would include the fact that all three generators were disconnected from
the system. Thus, the power flow solution would indicate a system blackout.
3.4.1.2 Under Frequency Load Shedding
Under Frequency Load Shedding (UFLS) is a countermeasure applied
by bulk power system operators [123] to reduce the incidence of generator
under-frequency tripping, which is a great danger to the reliable operation
of the power systems. UFLS is a coordinated disconnection of small and
non-critical loads (e.g., no Hospitals are ever disconnected) to prevent a large
blackout.
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To illustrate why it is important to consider UFLS in the simulation
of IoT demand attacks, let us first take a second look at Figure 3.9. As
observed, after the 15% load increase attack, the system frequency starts to
decrease. Because there is no action that could relieve the imbalance between
the increased load and unchanged generation, the system frequency declines
fast until it drops below the thresholds of frequency protections at generators.
Because the frequency stays below the thresholds for longer than the delay
time set at the frequency protections, the generators are disconnected and
there is a system blackout.
Now, let us compare the simulation results when we incorporate UFLS.
Figure 3.10 shows the frequency response to the 15% system demand increase
attack on the WSCC 9-bus system. The system frequency declines after the
IoT load increase attack starts at one second of the simulation time. The
frequency of the system then reaches the first UFLS threshold at 59.3 Hz,
and as a result, 5% of the system load is disconnected. However, this is not
enough and the system frequency keeps declining until it reaches the second
threshold: 58.9 Hz, and at that time a total of 15% of the system demand
is disconnected and the frequency stops decreasing and starts to stabilize.
The system frequency reaches a new stable state and there are no generator
disconnections from the system.
What is more, because of UFLS, the system load is reduced to a level
that no transmission line is overloaded as defined to be a line carrying power
flow that is greater than its rated capacity. Therefore, there are no cascading
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Figure 3.10: Frequency responses with Under Frequency Load Shedding to the
15% of load increase in the transient simulation.
Figure 3.11: Power flow on the transmission line connected between bus 7 and
bus 8 in the transient simulation
outages. In Figure 3.11, we can observe that the transmission line between bus
7 and bus 8 in Figure 3.7 is overloaded after the IoT demand increase attack
begins at one second. However, the power flow on the line soon decreases
following the load shedding event caused by UFLS and remains below its
rated capacity at the end of the transient simulation. As discussed in Section
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3.4.1.1, a power flow steady state simulation starts based on the solution of
the transient simulation; the results of this new steady state stability analysis
are shown in Figure 3.12. As seen in Figure 3.12, no line is overloaded and
the closed loop transient and steady state simulation ends.
Figure 3.12: Power flow results after the transient simulation with UFLS.
The example in this section shows that the simulation results will be
significantly affected if UFLS protections are considered. In fact, by includ-
ing UFLS, the closed-loop transient and steady state simulations used in this
work generates a result suggesting that the system would shed some demand,
but all the system transmission lines and generators will remain in operation.
This result is different from the cascading line outage suggested by our earlier
steady state simulation and the complete system blackout suggested by pre-
vious work [361]. This example shows the importance of detailed modeling of
61
transient response and protection.
3.4.1.3 Frequency Response Model
UFLS protections have been considered in previous work in [97] on load
attacks in power systems. However, the simplified frequency response model
in [97] does not fit well with the analysis of IoT demand attacks. The system
frequency responses in the study are modeled as a single large machine that
represented an “aggregation” of all the synchronous generators in the system.
Under this simplification, each of the generators in the system will respond
to a disturbance exactly the same as described by the model in [97]. The
assumption implicitly made by this simplification is that all the generators in
the system will always keep synchronism and respond identically. However,
when the system is under a significant disturbance, generators will respond
differently to the disturbance and the system will risk losing synchronism in a
short time after the disturbance. In some scenarios, the frequencies at different
buses will diverge from synchronism. This frequency diversity can not be
reflected in the single machine model studied by Dabrowski et al. [97]. A
detailed discussion of these phenomenon will be demonstrated with examples
in Section 3.4.2.5.
3.4.1.4 Power Flow, Line Overload Outage and Bus Voltage Outage
Power flow have been solved in previous work in [361]. Although not
directly specified, it is very likely the previous work [361] uses DC power flow
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for the cascading outage analyses. In contrast, we use PowerWorld [320] to
solve an AC power flow for each of the steady state simulations.
The computation of AC power flow gives voltage magnitude, phase
angles, and power flow on transmission lines. However, DC power flow is
a linearized calculation based on several assumptions ignoring variation in
voltage magnitudes. First, using a DC power flow model for cascade prediction
may result in a misrepresentation of the gravity of a cascade. Secondly, the
voltage changes in the cascading outages will not be captured in a DC power
flow. DC power flow is a simplification to obtain fast simulation results, but it
is not adequate in a study of a major disturbance like an IoT demand attack.
The line overload outage models also play an important role in under-
standing the impact of MadIoT attacks. Previous work in [361] relied on the
criteria described by Cetinay et al. [68], where a line will be removed from
the system if the steady-state results indicate that the power flow on the line
is greater than its rated capacity. When a transmission line is overloaded,
the heat generated from the extra power flow on the line will sag the trans-
mission line. Although it exposes the line to a possible outage from faults
associated with ground elements or vegetation, it does not necessarily cause
any immediate real danger to the system. In fact, under an emergency, the
system operator is allowed to use overloaded transmission lines for additional
transmission capacity [124]. Therefore, instead of immediately removing the
overloaded lines, we utilize an Overload Outage Checker (OOC) that will cal-
culate the time of tripping given the overload level. The details are described
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in Section 2.5. The time inverse calculation in the OOC will result in a quick
tripping time for the lines that are heavily overloaded. In this way, we approx-
imate the different actions taken at different levels of overload on transmission
lines.
Finally, the voltage profile of the system may decline when the system
is under extreme conditions and voltage collapse is a typical pattern seen
in cascading outages. Therefore, a Voltage Outage Checker is defined and
discussed in Section 2.6. To the best of our knowledge, we haven’t found a
specific model of voltage failures in the previous work of IoT demand attacks.
Based on the above discussions, we believe that, with a more detailed
and realistic model, our results of IoT demand attack simulations can provide
a different set of insights for similar studies.
3.4.2 Simulation Results in a Large Power System
In addition to the demand increase attacks, we also consider attacks
that increase and then subsequently decrease the load. The intuition for this
attack is that the demand increase attack may trigger system automatic re-
sponses such as UFLS and therefore cause the system to drop loads, for ex-
ample, to reverse the frequency decline. Then, a successive demand decrease
attack can potentially drive the system to an unstable state, because there is
less UFLS available after the first attack.
First, because of the features of an IoT attack, it is easy to increase
and decrease the demand in a short period time once the demand is compro-
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mised. In addition, if the attackers have some knowledge of the power system
operation, it would not be hard for them to figure out that there are some sys-
tem frequency protections that are designed to stop and reverse the frequency
drop caused by a sudden demand increase. The attackers will decrease the
demand when they think the system frequency reverses due to UFLS and by
doing so intend to overshoot the system frequency to be above the thresholds
of generator over-frequency protections in the hopes of causing a generator
disconnection.
This demand increase and decrease attack was studied by Dabrowski
et al. [97]. However, our results will differ because the simplification of the
frequency model in [361] as discussed in Section 3.4.1.3. In addition, if the
attacker can cyclically increase and decrease then decrease demand, it is also
reasonable to assume that the attacker is capable to achieve a repetition of
this cycle of attacks. This extends the attack in [361]. The simulation results
and detailed discussions of the experiments are shown in Section 3.4.2.4.
3.4.2.1 Terminology
First, as mentioned in Section 2.7, the loss of electric power caused by
load shedding from UFLS is temporary and can be quickly corrected within
an hour. However, a complete system blackout will result in all customers
in the system losing their electric power for several days before the system is
restored. Therefore, limited UFLS is nowhere as serious as a complete system
blackout.
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Second, as mentioned in Section 3.4.1.4, a transmission line is over-
loaded when the power flow on the line is over 100% of its rated capacity. As
discussed in Section 2.5, overloaded transmission lines are potential causes for
cascading failures but they do not necessarily lead to immediate disconnections
of the lines.
3.4.2.2 Cascading Failures on Transmission Lines after an IoT De-
mand Increase Attack
One outcome the attackers can attempt to achieve is to overload the
transmission lines and potentially cause cascading failures. Those severely
overloaded transmission lines will be disconnected by protection relays. The
trip time of the overload relay on the transmission lines is approximated by
equation (2.3). Then, the attack of load increase may cause cascading failures
on the transmission lines as discussed in Section 2.5. In the following sections,
we consider protection system responses to load increases of 1% and 10% as
suggested by previous work, together with some variations.
1% System Demand Increase Attack
One percent of the system load in this case study is equivalent to 822.7
MW. Figure 3.13 shows the bus frequency responses after 1% of load increase
occurring at second 1 and Figure 3.14 shows the power flow on branches as a
percent of the branch rated capacity.
From Figure 3.13, we can observe that the bus frequencies decline after
the attack at second 1 except for very few buses that are connected to the
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Figure 3.13: Frequency Response to 1% System Load Increase
region outside of the system with DC tie lines and thereby remain less affected.
The system frequency declines from 60 Hz to 59.875 Hz in about 9 seconds
and is settling towards a new stable state towards the end of the transient
simulation. As indicated in Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, the system frequency
doesn’t violate any thresholds of frequency protections on generators and loads.
Notice that we focus our study in a short time window, since 30 seconds of
transient simulation is enough to display the moving trends of the frequency
in this case. In Figure 3.13 we can see the how the frequency is affected after
the attack; however, as long as the bus frequency converges to a stable level,
driving the frequency back to 60Hz can be accomplished either automatically
or manually over a longer time scale.
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Figure 3.14: Branch Flow after 1% System Load Increase
In Figure 3.14, we can see that the power flow of some branches slightly
increases after the attack at second 1. However, no transmission line is over-
loaded due to the IoT 1% load increase attack alone. Note that some branches
are initially overloaded before the simulation and remain unchanged during
the simulation and the overload outage checker is not activated on those lines
under the assumption that protection in the actual system would not have
been activated under these conditions.
The results show that 1% of load increase attack does not interrupt
any generator or load in the system. In addition, in the end of the simulation,
there is no transmission line that is overloaded above its initial loading due to
this load increase attack.
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In contrast to our results showing fairly small changes to our system,
Soltan et al. [361] find that with a 1% increase in load there could be cascading
outages in the summer peak of the Polish grid. We are surprised that a sudden
1% increase is load can lead to cascades in a power system. The reason for
our surprise is the N-1 security criterion.
The N-1 criterion requires that electricity systems be operated to be
able to withstand sudden step changes in the supply-demand balance due to
outages of generation. The NERC disturbance control performance standard
[285] requires any system to be able to withstand “the most severe single
contingency” which may include certain common-model double outages. For
ERCOT, for example, (the Power Grid of Texas) this amounts to always having
2700 MW or more of reserves to cope with a simultaneous outage of nuclear
units having total production of around 2700 MW. To put that in perspective,
peak load in ERCOT is around 70GW, and 1% of 70GW is 700MW, which is
much smaller than the 2700MW of reserves carried in ERCOT.
While an increase by 700MW in load due to an IoT attack (and the
reaction by generation reserves) would result in somewhat different changes in
transmission flows compared to the effect of a 700MW decrease in generation
(and the reaction by generation reserves), it is unlikely that an increase in
load of 1% would result in any unacceptably adverse conditions on the trans-
mission system. This is because load is geographically distributed around the
system, so that it is unlikely for there to be a more than a 1% increase in most
transmission flows, and it is unlikely that the system is operating such that a
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1% increase in current would immediately trigger the overload protection.
In the Eastern and Western Interconnections of North America, the
total load is much larger (several hundred GW) but even 1% of this would
only amount to slightly more than the double outage of a nuclear unit. To
summarize, the results of the Polish power grid reported by Soltan et al. [361]
imply that the system being modeled is not N-1 secure. Since this is not an
allowable operating condition sunder NERC standards, we believe that a result
analogous to that in [361] is not credible for a North American System.
IoT Demand 10% System Demand Increase Attack
Ten percent of system load in our case study is equivalent to 8,227.3
MW, which would be equivalent to an adversary controlling approximately
over 8 million air conditioners. Figure 3.15 shows the bus frequency responses
after 10% of a load increase attack at 1s and Figure 3.16 shows the power flow
on branches as a percent of the branch rated capacity.
To better understand the variations of power flow depicted in Figure
3.16, consider Figure 3.15. From Figure 3.15, we can observe that the bus
frequencies plummet after the attack begins (1s). The only lines that are
not affected are the few buses that connect the power grid to another region
outside the system with DC tie lines. UFLSs are then activated at second 3.5
and reverse the system frequency decline by shedding 5% of the system load.
Again, as long as the bus frequency converges to a stable level, the differences
between the converged value and its initial value of 60 Hz can be made up
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Figure 3.15: Frequency Response to 10% System Load Increase
either automatically or manually over a longer time scale. Although the under
frequency shedding has no deliberate time delay as indicated in Table 3.4, a
0.02 second of relay operation time is included in the simulation. Therefore,
the load shedding occurs 0.02 second after the time frequency falls below the
first UFLS threshold of 59.3 Hz.
In Figure 3.16, we can find the power flows of some branches increase
after the attack at second 1. However, the power flows of those branches
drop to or gradually decrease to roughly their initial values after the action
of under frequency load shedding at 3.5 second. Therefore, at the end of
the simulation, there is no additional transmission line overloaded due to the
IoT load increase attack. Note that some branches are initially overloaded
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Figure 3.16: Branch Flow after 10% System Load Increase
before the simulation and remain unchanged during the simulation and so ,as
previously, the overload outage checker is not activated for those lines.
Thus, even with an assumption of 10% of load compromised and in-
creased by adversaries, our case study doesn’t suggest a major threat of cas-
cading failure on transmission lines. The simulation results show that the
quick action of under frequency load shedding after the load increase plays
a critical role in relieving the negative effects of the attack. The amount of
UFLS is intended to reflect ERCOT standards. The Eastern and Western In-
terconnections may have overall lower levels of UFLS than ERCOT; however,
they have much larger levels of inertia than ERCOT. We have not investigated
the situation in detail for the Eastern and Western Interconnections.
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3.4.2.3 IoT Demand Increase and Decrease Attack
One of the characteristics of an IoT attack is that the attack is highly
distributed and it is hard to detect. Once the load is compromised, it is
difficult to clear the threats in a short time after the adversaries launch their
first attack.
From the study in section 3.4.2.2, under frequency load shedding suc-
cessfully prevents cascading failures of transmission lines from a single load
increase attack. However, under an IoT demand attack, the adversary may be
able to reduce the compromised load again after the system under frequency
load shedding reverses the frequency decline in order to cause a frequency over-
shoot that may trigger over frequency relays on the generators and disconnect
generators.
Based on the simulation shown in Figure 3.15 and Figure 3.16, we
create an experiment of an IoT demand increase and then decrease attack.
The bus frequency responses are displayed in Figure 3.17. To make the highest
frequency overshoot from the load decrease, we choose to decrease the load at
second 20 where the bus frequencies roughly reaches to and stabilizes at the
maximum observed from Figure 3.15.
A straightforward approach in this experiment is to increase the load
in the first attack and decrease the same amount of load in the second at-
tack. However, we investigate a worse scenario where in the second attack,
we decrease by twice the amount of the load increase in the first attack. A
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Figure 3.17: Frequency Response to a Cycle of Load Increase and Decrease
scenario for this experiment is the attackers have control of some AC loads,
they may decide to run half of the AC loads until peak hour and then suddenly
increase to full capacity. The reason attackers might not want to keep the load
at zero before increasing to maximum capacity can be interpreted as follows:
First, the attacker may pick the peak hour when the system has the least
spare generation capacity in a day to launch this attack to stress the system
the most with a given amount of compromised load. Second, holding the AC
load at zero means keeping the AC off, and this would expose the attackers
to discovery. Therefore, holding the compromised load capacity at 50% be-
fore increasing them into the maximum during the peak hours is a proxy to
something the attackers may want to do to create larger impacts.
The result in Fig. 3.17 shows that the frequency does overshoot af-
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ter the loads decrease at second 20, however the system frequency tends to
stabilize at 61.7 Hz, which happens about 10 seconds later. From Table 3.3,
we can observe that 61.7 Hz will not cause an immediate generation trip by
the generators’ frequency protections. Again, it should be emphasized that
these protection parameters are intended to reflect ERCOT. The Eastern and
Western Interconnection may perform differently.
As mentioned in Section 3.4.2.2, 10% system load compromised by the
adversary is already a significant assumption. We take this even further to
20% of the system load in this simulation to see if the IoT attack can cause
a worse result. However, we still do not observe an immediate generation trip
after this demand increase and decrease attack in a system that is intended to
reflect ERCOT standards for UFLS.
3.4.2.4 Under Frequency Load Shedding in a Repeated IoT Attack
In section 3.4.2.3, we explored the attack of a “cycle” of load increase
and decrease. The adversary could repeat the attack cycle of increasing and
reducing the compromised load as long as their capabilities are not disabled.
The under frequency load shedding would disconnect some amount of de-
mand each time when the IoT attack causes the frequency drop below any
thresholds. Once the load is disconnected by Under-Frequency Load Shedding
(UFLS) systems, the restoration of shed load is coordinated between the Inde-
pendent System Operator (ISO), Transmission Service Providers (TSPs) and
Distribution Service Providers (DSPs) [123]. As discussed in Section 2.7, such
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restoration associated with coordinations between different entities may take
30 minutes to an hour to complete. Therefore, a potential negative effect of
such repeated attacks is that it can deplete the under frequency load shedding
resources before they are restored, which might eventually lead to a system
frequency failure.
However, it may take many cycles of IoT demand increase and decrease
attacks to deplete the UFLS resources. Therefore, the efficiency, even the
feasibility of the approach of using up the UFLS by such repeated IoT demand
attack remains unclear. The result in Fig. 3.15 shows that although the system
frequency needs additional measures to be brought back to its initial frequency
of 60 Hz, the frequency decline caused by 10% of system load increase can be
stopped by only 5% of system load shedding. From Table 3.4, in ERCOT 25%
of the system load is contracted with the ISO as UFLS and this level is modeled
in this study. Under this condition, the adversary needs to apply the attack
at least five times to deplete the UFLS resources. What is more, additional
under-frequency relays may be installed on transmission facilities with the
approval of the ISO provided the relays are set at 58.0 Hz or below [123].
That means, in reality, the adversary may need to apply the attack even more
times to deplete the UFLS and cause a possible system failure.
3.4.2.5 Over/Under Frequency Generator Tripping
In Section 3.4.2.3, we briefly discussed the potential threats of generator
disconnections caused by over frequency protections. In this section, we extend
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this discussion to IoT attacks that specifically target disturbing frequency and
causing generator disconnections by frequency protection. In order to observe
the response of frequency protection at generators, we studied the IoT attack
of load increase or decrease by 30% as suggested in [361].
Figure 3.18: Frequency Response to 30% System Load Increase
Fig. 3.18 shows the system frequency response to an IoT attack that
increase the system load by 30% at second 1. First, we can observe that due to
the sudden load increase, the bus frequencies decline dramatically and some
of them drop quickly below the first UFLS threshold of 59.3 Hz. Then 5%
of system load are disconnected by UFLS. We notice that the frequency at
some buses decline slower at the instant of the attack (potentially with no
direct connection of load before the attack) and haven’t reached any UFLS
thresholds. For convenience, we name this group of buses as Group 1. The
77
buses with DC tie lines that are less affected as mentioned in section 3.4.2.2 is
Group 2. The group of buses such that their frequencies decline faster and drop
below UFLS thresholds are named Group 3. The group names are indicated
in Fig. 3.18. Notice that, even within a group, the frequency responses are not
exactly the same. Because of the first UFLS action, the frequency deviation
between buses increases. After 5% of system load shed, the frequency at Group
1 potentially with more generation in the region starts to increase while the
frequency at Group 3 with insufficient generation keeps declining.
Shortly afterwards, the frequency at Group 3 declines to be below the
second and third UFLS thresholds - 58.9 Hz and 58.3 Hz at around second 2.6
and second 5.6, respectively. An additional 10% of system load is disconnected
on each occasion. The frequency deviation between Group 1 and Group 3 gets
larger after the two UFLSs. What is more, the frequency deviation between
buses in a group, especially in Group 1, increases after the actions of UFLS.
After the three UFLSs that disconnect a total 25% of system load, the fre-
quency decline at Group 3 is stopped. Because there is no additional load
shedding, the frequency at Group 1 stops increasing as well. Thus, although
the bus frequencies haven’t converged at the end of the simulation, they stop
further diverging and prevent frequency protections disconnecting generators.
Fig. 3.19 shows the system frequency response to an IoT attack that
decreases the system load by 30% at second 1. We can find the bus frequencies
increase fast after the attack and few of them go above the threshold of im-
mediate over frequency protections at generators - 61.8 Hz within 5 seconds.
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Figure 3.19: Frequency Response to 30% Load Decrease
The over frequency protections then disconnect generators that result in 25%
reduction of system generation. After the tripping of generators, the bus fre-
quencies reduce and converge to a value close to 60 Hz and no more protection
actions or failures are observed.
Compared to the system frequency response to an IoT attack that in-
creases the system load, we find that the bus frequencies react differently to
the IoT attack that decreases the system load. In Fig. 3.19, although the
frequencies of some buses increase faster than those in some other buses, the
frequencies gradually converge after 25% of the system generation is tripped.
One of the conclusions we can draw from this comparison is that a quick pro-
tection reaction in big scales like the generation tripping in Fig. 3.19 performs
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better than the gradual protection actions like the load shedding in Fig. 3.18
in terms of the system frequency restoration.
We also find that the tripped generations in this simulation consist of
a significant amount of wind generation. The benefit of disconnecting the
wind generation or any generation that doesn’t provide inertia in this condi-
tion is that the system loses less inertia after the over frequency protection
action. Therefore, the system doesn’t become weaker in terms of maintaining
frequency stability. This phenomenon suggests that generation that doesn’t
provide inertia could be included in the over frequency protection to protect
the system against any following attacks targeting at disturbing the system
frequency after an IoT attack.
3.5 Conclusion and Future Work
By implementing the COA model into a North American regional in-
terconnection system, we demonstrate that this method can be used to assess
the effects of different types of cyber attacks.
3.5.1 Conclusion
From the simulation results of cyber attacks target on grid control
centers, we find that the number of transmission lines outaged at a given
voltage level in the attacked TDSP is critical as a predictor of an algorithmic
non-convergence. There exists a threshold at each voltage level such that
an algorithmic non-convergence will happen when the attacked TDSP has
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more branches tripped than the threshold. We also observe that if the system
survived from the contingency, then an attack on a TDSP with more branches
at the lower voltage levels would cause more load lost.
From the simulation results of IoT demand attacks, we show that, 1%
of load increase attack does not interrupt any generator, load, or transmission
line in the system. We also find that, thanks to under frequency load shedding
protections, a 10% of sudden IoT load increase does not cause a cascading
failure on the transmission lines. In addition, a “frequency swing attack”
is defined as a cycle of load increase and decrease IoT attack that aims to
push the frequency swing to violate the frequency protection thresholds in
the system. However, the frequency swing attack doesn’t show an ability to
cause an immediate disconnection of generators. A possible repeated frequency
swing attack has been discussed. The impacts of depleting the UFLS resources
are discussed. The analysis shows the effectiveness of such attack would be
impacted by any additional frequency protection measures in the system.
Last but not the least, a single IoT attack targeted at disturbing the
system frequency is presented. The simulation results show that, load shedding
by UFLS would split the frequencies at buses under a sudden IoT attack
increasing 30% of the system demand. The same amount of IoT load decrease
attack would cause swift frequency increases and make some bus frequencies
pass the thresholds of the over frequency protections that result in generator
disconnections. The simulation shows the actions of UFLS and over frequency
protection are sufficient to prevent an immediate system failure over a short
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time after the attack. Additional actions may be needed over a longer time
scale to restore the stable operation of the system, but the main point is that a
system blackout will likely not occur in this situation. In addition, we discover
that including generations that are not providing inertia in the over-frequency
protections would benefit the system in case of following IoT attacks targeting
at disturbing the system frequency.
3.5.2 Future Work
The results from simulation with rotor angle checker cannot be vali-
dated since the data is generic and not specific to the real system generators.
However, for the cyber attacks targets on grid control center, we expect that
with accurate transient data, the intensity (number or amount) of algorith-
mic non-convergence cases and load lost may be changed, but the general
observation, for example, that tripping equal amount of generations and loads
would not cause an algorithmic non-convergence, may still be valid. There-
fore, results qualitatively similar to the outcomes in this study are expected
if accurate transient data were available. We hope to be able to utilize more
accurate transient data in the future.
The model developed to simulate the IoT demand attack is not perfect.
As discussed in 3.2 and above, there are certain limitations in the studies.
Particularly, the results from transient simulations can be more precise if a
detailed transient data for a large system becomes available. We believe the
type of protections considered in this study is the subset of the protections
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in power systems that would contribute to a cascading outage the most after
a disturbance in the system. However, future work can be done to explore
the impacts from other protections that are commonly equipped in the power
systems e.g. different protections on buses [149]. In addition, in this study,
we considered only an IoT demand attack that is evenly distributed across all
the load points in the system. However, in the future work, we will consider
IoT demand attacks targeting only a part of the system.
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Chapter 4
Power System Interdiction Problem
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, an interaction problem between a defender (e.g. sys-
tem operator) and an attacker (e.g. terrorist) in a power system is presented.
The electric system is designed to satisfy the N-1 security criterion, which
means the system could lose any one of its N components (such as generators,
transmission lines) and continue operating within emergency limits. However,
when multiple, simultaneous contingencies occur, the system might experience
various stability problems, which might lead to the large cascading events de-
scribed in Chapter 2. Outages are typically caused by storms or other extreme
weather conditions but could also be carried out deliberately by knowledge-
able attackers with little risk of detection. The cyber attacks on power systems
studied in chapter 3 are good examples. Further well-planned and coordinated
attacks by terrorists could leave the electric power system in a large region of
the country at least partially disabled for a very long time [95].
In [338], an interdiction problem is formulated as a bi-level mixed-
integer programming problem. A decomposed heuristic algorithm was devel-
oped. The algorithm starts with the defender solving a DC-OPF problem
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(with no attack), the “sub-problem.” The result is an optimal power flow and
generation dispatch that minimize generation costs without any load shed-
ding. A “value” is assigned to each interdictable asset based on, for example,
the power flow on it. Based on the result of the “sub-problem,” the attacker
solves a “master problem” to identify an interdiction plan that maximizes the
estimated value of interdicted assets while not exceeding available interdiction
resources. With this plan, the constraints of the DC-OPF problem are modi-
fied and the new “sub-problem” is solved. Given the interdictions, the result of
the DC-OPF problem minimizes generation costs and the penalty associated
with load shedding. Typically, some load will be shed in the new solution since
valuable assets have been removed from the grid. The process continues by
finding alternative interdiction plans and by evaluating load shedding and sys-
tem operation cost for each of them. The heuristic algorithm has the drawback
that it can require many iterations to obtain a close-to-optimal solution.
Salmeron et al. [339] introduced Global Benders Decomposition (GLBD)
to solve the same problem described in [338] and observed convergence toward
the optimal solution even with a non-linear sub-problem. Like Benders De-
composition(BD) [39], the algorithm does build a concave piecewise-linear ap-
proximating function to the function being maximized. Unlike BD, However,
the function being approximated need not be concave. The key advantage of
GLBD over a single level MILP formulation is that the algorithm’s subprob-
lems represent simple, familiar instances of the primal linear program OPF.
Thus, the user need not maintain a problem that involves unfamiliar con-
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structs from the dual of the OPF model that are complicated by interactions
with binary variables as in Mixed-Integer LP procedure in [276] and as in the
KKT method to solve the subproblem described in [428].
The Cascading Outage Analysis (COA) model analyzes both transient
and steady state system responses to contingencies. These are “short-term”
effects of an attack, but may have various implications. Therefore, to better
represent the system responses to an attack, the COA model is incorporated as
a sub-problem in the interdiction framework in [398] in addition to DC-OPF
used in [338] and [339]. Because of the non-linearity brought by COA model,
the problem in [398] is solved through a heuristic method that is similar to the
algorithm in [338].
In this chapter, the efficiency of the application of the GLBD method
on the bi-level system interdiction problem with DC-OPF as the sub-problem
is first presented. Then work will be proposed to use the same method to
solve the problem with COA model incorporated in the sub-problem. The
test systems are built on a PowerWorld 7 bus OPF case and a PowerWorld 37
bus system with transient stability model and generic costs for OPF.
4.2 Problem Formulation
The problem is first formulated as a bi-level model to maximize the
load shedding and medium-term system operational costs as in [339]. The DC
Optimal Power Flow (DC-OPF) problem is included as a “sub-problem.” The
DC-OPF problem is a linear optimization problem run by the system operator
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to economically dispatch the system generations. The objective of DC-OPF
is to minimize the total system generation costs. The cost of any unserved
load is also included as a penalty in the DC-OPF problem. Based on the DC-
OPF solution, the integer interdiction problem is formulated as the “master
problem.” The objective of the master problem is to maximize the minimum
objective value of the sub-problem over choices of interdiction plan.
4.2.1 Sub-problem
Indices:
i ∈ I set of buses;
g ∈ G set of generating units connected to bus i;
l ∈ L set of transmission lines;
o(l) origin bus of line l;
d(l) destination bus of line l.
Data [units]:
Hg generation cost of unit g [$/MWh];
Qi load shedding cost at bus i [$/MWh];
P̄Gg maximum output from generating unit g [MW];
P̄Ll transmission capacity for line l [MW];
Bl series susceptance of line l [ohm
−1];
Dl load at bus i [MW];
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δLl attack on transmission line l provided by the master problem;
δGg attack on generator g provided by the master problem;
δLl attack on transmission line l provided by the master problem;
δIi attack on bus i provided by the master problem;
Variables [units]:
θi phase angle at bus i [radians];
pLl power flow on line l [MW];
pGg generation from unit g [MW];
si load shed at bus i [MW];




















pLl = Di − si, ∀i ∈ I. (OPF.3)
−P̄Ll (1−δ
L
l )(1−δIo(l))(1−δId(l)) ≤ pLl ≤ P̄Ll (1−δLl )(1−δIo(l))(1−δId(l)), ∀l ∈ L.
(OPF.4)
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0 ≤ pGg ≤ P̄Gg (1− δGg )(1− δIi ), ∀g ∈ G. (OPF.5)
0 ≤ si ≤ Di, ∀i ∈ I. (OPF.6)
θ|I| = 0. (OPF.7)
The objective function (OPF.1) minimizes generation costs and load-
shedding costs in $/h. Constraints (OPF.2) are linearized admittance con-
straints that approximate active power flows on AC lines. Constraints (OPF.3)
maintain power-balance at the buses. Constraints (OPF.4) and constraints
(OPF.5) set maximum power flows for lines and maximum generating-unit
outputs, respectively. Constraints (OPF.4) represents that when line l or the
bus at either end of line l is attacked given by the master problem (δLl = 1,
δIo(l) = 1 or δ
I
d(l) = 1), power flow on line l (p
L
l ) has to be zero. The same
for constraints (OPF.5), it forces the power output of a generator g to be
zero when the generator is attacked or the bus the generator connected to
is attacked. Constraints (OPF.6) ensure that load-shedding does not exceed









δK ∈ 4 ⊆ {0, 1}|K|. (IPF.2)
K = I ∪ L ∪G. (IPF.3)
In (IPF.1) min
p∈P(δK ;D)
f̄(p) denotes OPF in shorthand, with the vector p in-
corporating all decision variables in the sub-problem, with P(δK ;D) represent-
ing (OPF.2)-(OPF.7), and with f̄(.) representing (OPF.1). Constraint (IPF.2)
represents resource-limited, binary interdiction plans defined on generic com-
ponents k ∈ K, and p ∈ P(δK ;D) represents feasible operation of the power
grid with demand vector D and with operating components that are dictated
by δK . More precisely, for δKk ∈ 4, δKk = 1 if component k (i.e. a line, a bus
or a generator) is attacked and disabled, and δKk = 0, otherwise.
4.3 Methods and Algorithms to Solve the Problem
4.3.1 Mixed-Integer-Programming
The difficulty of formulating this problem as a standard mixed-integer
program (MIP) comes from the non-convex, max-min nature of the problem
[341]. If we combine two problems into a standard MIP, then the original
sets L, I and G in the sub-problem are modified to L(δL), I(δI) and G(δG)
respectively. Therefore, in constraints (OPF.4) and (OPF.5), δKk ∀k ∈ K are
no longer given data but decision variables.
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Therefore, these non-linear terms make MIP even harder to solve. Pre-
vious researches have tried to solve the MIP by linearizing those terms. How-
ever, empirical results suggest that it is not an efficient way to solve the prob-
lem. For a 48-bus scenario, the method takes up to three minutes to solve on
a personal computer [341].
4.3.2 Bi-level Optimization and Heuristic Method
The optimal solution of the bi-level problem can be reached through a
heuristic method by solving series of sub-problems and master problems. The
master-problem introduced in section 4.2.2 is reformulated to [339]:
Formulation : IPF (K; M̄).
Data [units]:
αnk index or value of each element k at iteration n [MW];
M̄ limit of attacks on elements [NA];
Variable:











δKk ≤ M̄. (IPF.2’)
δK ∈ {0, 1}|K|. (IPF.3’)
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The index vector αnk is calculated based on the operation solution from
sub-problem as coefficients of elements in the system. The calculation of co-
efficients aims to capture the attackers’ “interest” in each element or the “im-
portance” of each element. For example, the coefficients for transmission lines
can be the power flow on the lines. Then, the objective function (IPF.1’) max-
imize the “importance” of selected elements. Constraint (IPF.2’) indicates the
maximum number of elements can be attacked due to the resource limits.
The heuristic method is straightforward. Starting with δK = 0, the
product terms introduced in section 4.3.1 become constants. Then, the sub-
problem described in section 4.2.1 will provide a feasible operation solution
p ∈ P(δK ;D). Using p, a index vector αnk is calculated. The master problem
(IPF.1’) is solved and provides a new interdiction plan. These attacked ele-
ments are disconnected in the system topology and the sub-problem is solved
under the new attacking plan. The system cost (including cost of load shed-
ding) gained at each iteration is recorded. The heuristic procedure continues
for a fixed number of iterations or until a time limit is reached. Then the inter-
diction plan associated with the maximum system cost is the optimal solution
of the problem. The heuristic procedure can handle large-scale models be-
cause both the DC-OPF sub-problem and MIP master problem can be solved
quickly, even at large scale.
One thing we need to handle in the heuristic method is that we need
to prevent the master problem from repeating the same interdiction solutions
that appeared in any previous iteration in order to speed up the convergence.
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(1− δKk ) ≤ |K| − 1. (IPF.4’)
where δ̂Kk is any interdiction solution that has already been evaluated. This
constraint forces any new solution δK to differ from δ̂K in at least one com-
ponent; such a “super-valid inequality” [194] guarantees not to eliminate any
optimal solution unless the incumbent solution is already optimal.
4.3.3 Global Benders Decomposition
The heuristic procedures need to go through all solutions to guaran-
tee convergence. It normally takes a very large number of iterations to reach
the optimal in a big system. Reference [260] proposed a new method called
Global Benders Decomposition (GLBD). The algorithm alternates between
an integer-programming master problem and one or more linear-programming
sub-problems. Like Benders Decomposition and Generalized Benders Decom-
position [9], the GLBD does build a concave, piecewise-linear approximating
function to the function being maximized [260]. The decomposition relies on
a sequence of upper-bounding piecewise-linear functions for the interdictor’s
objective. The maximum of those functions must converge to the optimal so-
lution of the master problem IPF since only a finite number of interdiction
plans exist; however, practical use of the decomposition is more interested in
finding verifiable close-to-optimal solutions quickly.
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GLBD Algorithm
Initialization : ε ≥ 0 optimality tolerance;
δ̂K = 0 initial interdiction plan;
4̂ ← {δ̂K}initial subset of feasible interdiction plans;
δ̂K∗ ← δ̂K current best plan for the interdictor;
z∗ ← 0 lower bound on cost of the best plan;
z̄ ←∞ upper bound on cost of the best plan;
Sub− problem :
Solve the problem with current iteration plan δ̂K , OPF (δ̂K), receive
solution p(δ̂K) and objective value f(δ̂K).
If f(δ̂K) ≥ z∗, then z∗ ← f(δ̂K) and δ̂K∗ ← δ̂K ;
If z̄−z∗ ≤ εz∗, then report (δ̂K∗, z∗) as the ε-optimal solution and halt;
Otherwise 4̂ ← 4̂ ∪ {δ̂K} and go to Master Problem;
Master Problem :
Add following generalized Benders cuts and formulate MP (4̂) as:
MP (4̂) : z(4̂) = max
δK∈4,z
z. (MP.1)




K)(δKk − δ̂Kk ), ∀δ̂K ∈ 4̂. (MP.2)
94
Solve MP (4̂) for new interdiction plan δ̂K and for objective value
z(4̂), and set z̄ ← z(4̂);
If z̄−z∗ ≤ εz∗, then report (δ̂K∗, z∗) as the ε-optimal solution and halt;
Otherwise, return to Sub-problem step.
4.3.4 Short-term Effects and Cascading Outage Analysis
While the DC-OPF problem used in the interdiction models represents
the economical operation (medium-term) of the power system and maximizes
the amount of load that can be served, it is a steady-state optimization frame-
work that does not consider short-term cascading outage effects. “Short-term”
means the time window of seconds to minutes while “medium-term” indicates
minutes to hours or even days.
Many large blackouts are caused by a consecutive series of various out-
ages following an initial disturbance as described in Chapter 2. Therefore, the
amount of short-term load shed should be calculated to evaluate the short-
term impacts of an attack. The details of the COA model is shown in Chapter
2. Then, the DC-OPF model can be replaced by the COA model as the sub-
problem in the GLBD method to consider the short term effects of an attack
in the interdiction problem. In the GLBD algorithm, the COA model will take
the current interdiction plan δ̂K and give system operation solutions under the
attack p(δ̂K) and system operating cost f(δ̂K)COA at each iteration. After the
COA model is implemented, as expected, the load shedding due to an attack
is more intense than the medium term effects. In a 37 bus test system with
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total of 57 transmission lines, tripping 10 of them would easily cause half of
the total load to be shed in the short term. However, it should be recognized
that in the medium term, some of this load can be restored since only some of
the lines may have been damaged. The medium term model can be interpreted
as evaluating how much of the load can be restored after any initial cascade.
In the GLBD algorithm, a valid Bender’s cut (IPF.4’) at each iteration
in the Master Problem is easier to determine when the sub-problem is a con-
vex problem such as the DC-OPF problem. Because the cost of load lost is
usually larger than the system operation cost, we can use this information to
generate a usually valid upper bound for the master problem for an attack on
a transmission line. However, this is not always true with the COA model.
The line outages in the transient simulation would cause variations on both
system frequency and generator rotor angles. It is possible that the cascading
outages after the initial line outages cause more load shedding than the power
flow on the tripped lines.
Although the Bender’s cuts generated by COA may not be valid due
to the cascading effects, it is still plausible to find a close to optimal solution
for the interdiction problem. From our previous study of cyber attacks in the
power systems, we discovered some approximate linear correlations between
the total disrupted power flows in an attack and the load lost post the attack
under the simulation with COA model. For example, this is shown in Fig.
3.6. A similar correlation is observed from the simulation results of attacks on
69 kV transmission lines in the 37 Bus system as shown Fig. 4.1. Given the
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Figure 4.1: Load Lost of Attacks on 69kV Lines.
power flow of attacked transmission lines, we can approximate the load lost
using the experimental linear regression results that can be generated before
the GLBD algorithm starts. Then, the “importance” index for each attack can
be calculated as αk(δ̂
K)COA. With the system operating cost updated from the
COA simulation f(δ̂K)COA, the benders cut generated at each iteration in a
master problem is shown in (MP.2’) and the structure of the GLBD algorithm
remains unchanged.






k − δ̂Kk ), ∀δ̂K ∈ 4̂. (MP.2’)
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4.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we first show the results of a case study of interdiction
problem considering only the medium-term effects with the optimal power flow
problem (OPF) as the sub-problem.
4.4.1 Medium-term Effects
To generate an illustrative example, we limit the attack to only trans-
mission lines. The Medium-term effects of attacks on transmission lines of a
7 bus test system are evaluated. The Heuristic method is implemented first
and then the Global Benders Decomposition (GLBD) is applied. The results
show the effectiveness of GLBD on finding the optimal or close to optimal
interdiction plans on transmission lines.
Table 4.1: Results of Transmission Line Attacks on a 7 Buses System
Attack Limit GLBD Heuristic
M̄ Iteration Cost Iteration Cost
2 12 17,597 45 17,930
3 42 20,134 120 20,919
4 46 21,073 210 21,073
Table 4.1 shows the performance details of both methods. M̄ denotes
the limit on the number of lines can be attacked. There are total 10 lines in
the test system. Given the attack limit, the number of iterations in Heuristic is
the number of possible attack combinations. Therefore, the optimal objective
value provided by the Heuristic is chosen to be the global optimal value in the
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problem. Given ε = 0.8, it can be observed that the ε-optimal solution from
GLBD are close to or even equal to the global optimal solution from Heuristic
methods. However, the number of iterations in GLBD is much less than for
the Heuristics method.
Table 4.2: Contrast Between GLBD and Heuristics
Attack Limit Iteration Increase Obj Improvement
M̄=2 375 % 1.9 %
M̄=3 286 % 3.8 %
M̄=4 456 % 0.0 %
Using the results from Table 4.1, the number of iterations and the
objectives are further compared in Table 4.2. Results in Table 4.2 indicate
that applying GLBD to the problem will save two to four times of iterations
by sacrificing only less than 4% on the optimal objective values. It should be
understood that, for practical problems, the computational time for checking
all combinations with the heuristic is impractical.
4.4.2 Short-term Effects
Then, we show the results of a case study of interdiction problem con-
sidering short-term effects with the cascading outage analysis (COA) as the
sub-problem. The correlations between the power flow on transmission lines
and load shedding shown in Fig. 4.1 are included in the global benders decom-
position (GLBD) method to generate benders cut at each iteration as described
in Section 4.3.4.
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The short-term effects of attacks on 69 kV transmission lines are studied
in a 37 bus system. To test the intuition of GLBD method in an interdiction
problem with COA, we limit the size of the attacks to two and three.
The Heuristic method is applied to be a benchmark. The results show
the effectiveness of GLBD on finding the optimal or a close to optimal inter-
diction plan.
Table 4.3: Results of Transmission Line Attacks on a 37 Buses System
Attack Limit GLBD Heuristic
M̄ Iteration Cost Iteration Cost
2 26 3,877 378 3,877
3 329 3,914 3276 3,914
Table 4.3 shows the performance details of both methods. M̄ denotes
the limit on the number of 69 kV transmission lines can be attacked. There
are total 28 of 69 kV transmission lines in the test system. Given the attack
limit, the number of iterations in Heuristic is the number of possible attack
combinations. Therefore, the optimal objective value received in Heuristic is
the global optimal value in the problem. Given ε = 2, it can be observed that
the ε-optimal solution from GLBD are equal to the global optimal solution
from Heuristic methods. However, the number of iterations in GLBD is much
less than the Heuristics method.
The number of iterations and the objectives are further compared in
Table 4.4. Results in Table 4.4 indicate the proposed method in the interdic-
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Table 4.4: Contrast Between GLBD and Heuristics
Attack Limit Iteration Increase Obj Improvement
M̄=2 14.53 0 %
M̄=3 9 0 %
tion problem considering short-term effects can save more than ten times of
iterations.
4.4.3 Discussion of Computation Effects
To the best of our knowledge, there is no general theory about the size
of system effects on the computations for Benders’ Decomposition or Global
Benders’ Decomposition method. However, Benders’ Decomposition has been
applied in a wide range of problems in the literature and the efficiency of
Benders’ Decomposition has been demonstrated.
In the interdiction problem discussed in this chapter, the majority com-
putation efforts of the proposed method are from the sub-problem which is the
simulation of cascading outage analysis (COA) which involved with the solver,
PowerWorld, solving differential equations for the system dynamic in the stud-
ied time window. However, the size of the sub-problem remains unchanged in
each iteration. Compare to the sub-problem, the master problem can be solved
much faster. The master problem starts with only few constraints as described
in Section 4.3.3. The number of constraints in the master problem grows along
with iterations due to one benders cut is added each time. However, we expect
the algorithm converge before it reaches too many iterations. Therefore, we
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are expecting a close to linear growth on computational efforts with number
of iterations. For a small system shown in Section 4.4.2 , in Table 4.3, the
computation time when M̄ = 2 with GLBD is 520 seconds and 8844 seconds
with Heuristic.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, the Global Benders Decomposition method is discussed
and implemented. First, the efficiency of the GLBD method in solving the bi-
level system interdiction problem with DC-OPF sub-problem is confirmed and
presented with a 7 bus illustrative system.
The work is extended to include the COA model to consider the short-
term impacts of attacks. The GLBD algorithm with the COA model as the
sub-problem is implemented in a 37 bus test system. Because of the cascading
effects, it is difficult to find valid Bender’s cuts. However, with a good “im-
portance” measurement for elements in the master problem, it is still feasible
to find a close to optimal solution. From our previous study on the cyber
attacks in the power systems, we discovered some approximate linear correla-
tions between the total disrupted power flows in an attack and the load lost
post attack under the simulation with COA model. A similar correlation is
observed in the 37 Bus system. This correlation is used for generating Ben-
der’s cuts in the GLBD algorithm. Case studies and tests in the 37 Bus system
shown the efficiency of the proposed method and the computational effects of







Combined Cycle Unit Formulation
5.1 Introduction
In the first part of this dissertation, we introduced cascading outage
analysis and cyber attacks on power systems in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
The model and knowledge learned in the two chapters are applied in a power
system interdiction problem as described and discussed in Chapter 4. The
interdiction problem is formulated as a mixed-integer programming (MIP) in
Chapter 4.
In the second part of this dissertation, we focus on another typical
mixed-integer programming problem in power systems – the unit commitment
problem. The unit commitment (UC) problem in a power system determines
the start-up and shut down schedules of generating units to meet forecast de-
mand in a short term future (few hours to few days). The objective of a UC
problem is to minimize the total generation costs; that, is to maximize the so-
cial welfare assuming demand is fixed in each time interval. Unit commitment
decisions (binary variables) and unit dispatch levels (continuous variables) are
determined for each future time interval considered. A large set of operational
constraints also has to be met in the problem. Therefore, the UC problem
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is a complex optimization problem that can be formulated as a mixed-integer
programming problem.
There are new features in electricity markets that may involve for-
mulation modifications and potentially add computational complexity to the
UC problem. One such new feature is the participation of combined cycle
gas power plants. A combined cycle power plant has a combination of gas and
steam turbine units. The exhaust heat from a gas turbine is utilized in a steam
turbine to generate more electricity. Combined cycle units (CCUs) have higher
efficiency, lower CO2 emission, better flexibility, and faster response than many
other more traditional thermal generators. Therefore, there is an increasing
trend of installing combined cycle units [201], [52].
Consequently, optimization models have been proposed to determine
the configuration and operation of CCUs in the electricity market. However,
there are assumptions made in existing models that are often violated in prac-
tice. In this chapter, we will first address a one interval transition assumption
made in the existing models. A mixed-integer programming formulation that
represents the transition ramping of CCUs and removes the invalid assump-
tions of one interval transitions is proposed in [181]. A set of configuration-wise
ramping constraints are formulated with the transition ramping model. Nu-
merical studies are performed on a MISO system. The work in this chapter
builds on the work in [181].
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5.2 Background and Motivation
CCUs have many advantages compared to traditional thermal units
including shorter installation time, lower levelized cost of electricity, faster
response time, less CO2 emissions, as well as higher operation efficiency and
reliability [201] and [238]. In addition, because of the new horizontal drilling
and hydraulic fracturing techniques, huge shale gas reserves have been discov-
ered in the U.S. and natural gas has become available with a price comparable
to that of coal [98]. Therefore, CCUs have made up the majority of the new
generation capacities in the last decade, and an even higher share of CCUs is
expected in the near future [300].
The operation of a CCUs is different compared to a traditional thermal
unit. There is at least one combustion turbine (CT) and one steam turbine
(ST) in a CCU. The exhaust gas from CTs can be used by a heat recovery
steam generator to produce steam and drive STs to achieve an overall higher
efficiency in the plant compared to a pure combustion gas plant. A CCU can
work on different configurations incurring various on/off status combinations of
CTs and STs, which have different physical and economic features, e.g., ramp
rates, operation cost, feasible transitions between configurations, etc. These
complicated operation characteristics in CCUs lead to major challenges to the
market modeling and clearing processes. Currently, six CCUs models exist
in academic research and industry practice, namely aggregate model, pseudo
unit model, component-based model, configuration-based model, edge-based
model and configuration-component hybrid model. In [98], Dai et al. provide
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a summary of the first five models and discuss the configuration-component
based model in detail.
For example, in a configuration based CCU model, each specific com-
bination of turbines in a CCU is a configuration and the CCU is committed
to operate in exactly one of these configurations in any given time interval.
Certain rules have to be followed in the operations due to the physical limits.
For instance, a ST has to be dependent on at least one CT and cannot be op-
erated independently. Fig. 5.1 shows an example of feasible configurations and
transitions between different configurations for a CCU with one CT and one
ST, known as a 1-on-1 CCU. Also, at any given time only one configuration in
a CCU can be committed, where we recognize that the “alloff” configuration
corresponds to the CCU being out of service.
Figure 5.1: Configurations and feasible transitions of a 1-on-1 CCU.
With high shares of variable renewable energy sources and increasing
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supply variability, thermal power plants have seen more frequent start-ups
and shut-downs [344]. In particular, many combined cycle units (CCUs) have
been operated to provide flexibility to the power systems. In the past, CCUs
might run for lengthy periods of time and serve as base load generation. How-
ever, they now increasingly are being required to respond quickly to variations
caused by intermittent supply and demand. The fast output response from a
CCU would result in more frequent transitions between configurations in the
CCU.
Therefore, it becomes more important to solve the UC problem and
optimize the social welfare considering the operation of CCUs with different
configurations. Some system operators have already implemented the opti-
mization of CCU configurations in day-ahead unit commitment. In addition,
optimizing their configurations in real time (e.g., through “look-ahead” com-
mitment) can pre-position CCUs to cope with the variability in the system.
However, most existing CCU models assume that the transition be-
tween any configurations can be completed within one time interval. This
assumption is invalid. First, some transitions, especially the transition that
involves starting a new turbine, that can take several hours. It is invalid to
assume transitions occur within one interval in look-ahead commitment and
dispatch models where the length of the time interval is fifteen minutes or even
as short as five minutes. To accurately model the transitions, a mixed-integer




Our contributions to the CCU transition ramping model compared to
the formulation in [181] are:
1. A set of configuration-wise ramping constraints are formulated and
compared to the plant-wise ramping constraints in [181].
2. The CCU transition ramping formulation [181] along with different
ramping constraints is implemented in a MISO prototype UC model.
3. Numerical tests on a MISO system is presented. The results show
that there is a moderate increase in computational complexity when
transition ramping modeling.
4. Computational impacts of different ramping constraints in the tran-
sition ramping model is discussed and presented in the case study.
5.4 Literature Review
The literature review of existing modeling approaches for combined
cycle units and the discussion of the issues with the existing models for CCU
transitions are presented in [181, Section 5.2], thereby is summarized here.
Currently, many ISOs in the US (e.g., MISO, PJM, and ISO-NE) use
an aggregated modeling approach for CCUs in their UC model [128]. The
aggregated approach assumes that at each time interval each CCU may either
be on or off, which is only a rough approximation for CCUs that have multiple
configurations. Besides the aggregated approach, there are mainly two types
109
of modeling approaches of CCUs in the unit commitment problem. The first
approach is the component-based (or physical-unit-based) modeling [86]: each
of the physical units of a CCU is represented by a set of commitment and
dispatch variables. This approach has been recognized as more suitable for
security analysis than for market-clearing [189], in part because many technical
parameters would have to be submitted to the ISO had this approach been
adopted. Another approach is the configuration-based modeling in which each
configuration of a CCU is represented by a set of commitment and dispatch
variables [69,230]. This approach is viewed as suitable for market clearing and
bid/offer processing [11, 189], and is adopted by CAISO and ERCOT [272].
However, as pointed out by [128], the standard configuration-based approach
cannot describe the minimum up/down time constraints of each individual CT
and ST in a CCU. To this end, an edge-based formulation is proposed in [128]
and [129] in which the minimum run time constraints of each individual turbine
are captured, at the cost of introducing more variables into the formulation.
In addition, a new configuration-based model is proposed in [98] where the
minimum run time constraints of individual turbines are formulated in the
configuration-based variables via projection.
Most of the existing CCU models make a hidden assumption that all
transitions are completed within a single interval. As a result, the CCU is
modeled as dispatchable during any interval. This assumption may lead to a
discrepancy between the model and the reality, as well as suboptimal commit-
ment and dispatch decisions.
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A CCU’s electrical output is reasonably predictable during the non-
dispatchable startup and transition process [13]. Therefore, the transition
ramping can be modeled as a fixed power trajectory. The start-up and shut-
down trajectories of simple-cycle units have been studied in [271]. A mixed-
integer programming model for CCUs where the invalid assumption is removed
and the power output of CCUs in transition is modeled as a fixed trajectory
is proposed in [181].
5.5 Mathematical Formulation of Transition Ramping
Model
In this section, we first introduce a standard configuration-based for-
mulation for CCU that has appeared in previous literature and which assumes
the completion of any transition within a single interval. Next, a transition
ramping model is built upon the standard formulation [181] and the aforemen-
tioned assumption is removed. For brevity, we only show the constraints that
define the feasible region of a single CCU. Embedding these equations into a
complete MIP formulation of unit commitment problem is straightforward.
5.5.1 Standard Configuration-Based Formulation
We show a standard configuration-based formulation from [272]. Let y
index the set of configurations Y. Let t ∈ {1, . . . , T} index the time intervals.
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Decision Variables In configuration-based modeling, each configuration
has a set of binary variables x, and each feasible transition has a set of bi-
nary variables v. The decision variables are:
xyt Binary variable for whether configuration y ∈ Y is on at t;
vy,y
′
t Binary variable for transition between y ∈ Y and y′ ∈ Y from
t− 1 to t;
pyt Continuous variable for power output from configuration y ∈ Y
at t;
pt Continuous variable for power output of the CCU at t.
Constraints





t , ∀t, ∀y ∈ Y, (5.1)
where py and py are, respectively, the lower and upper bound of
power output from configuration y.




pyt , ∀t. (5.2)
• Configurations are mutually exclusive:
∑
y∈Y
xyt = 1, ∀t. (5.3)
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t , ∀t,∀y ∈ Y. (5.4)
where MF,y is the set of reachable configurations from y ∈ Y, and
MT,y is the set of configurations that can reach y ∈ Y.





t ≤ 1, ∀t, (5.5)
where M is the set of all feasible transitions.
We note that there might be additional constraints characterizing the
feasible set of a CCU, including ramping and minimum run time of each con-
figuration or turbine. However, since these constraints are irrelevant to the
representation of the transition between configurations, we omit them here.
The feasible set of a CCU under the single-interval transition assumption is
defined by constraints (5.1)–(5.5).
5.5.2 Transition Ramping Formulation
The CCU transition model that removes the assumption of single time
interval transition is summarized in this section and a full representation with






i the total power output from the CCU in transition at the end
of the i-th interval of the transition process between y and y′.
TDyy
′
the duration (number of intervals) of the transition process





2 , . . . , TP
yy′
TDyy′
) is a vector that describes the tran-
sition power-trajectory.
Decision Variables:
wyt Binary variable for whether configuration y is dispatchable at
t;
xyt Binary variable for whether configuration y is either 1) dis-




t Binary variable for transition from y at t − 1 to y′ at t. The
transition variable becomes one when a new configuration be-
comes dispatchable;
pyt Continuous variable for power output from configuration y ∈ Y
at t;
pt Continuous variable for power output of the CCU at t.
Constraints Constraints (5.3)–(5.5) are kept from the standard formulation.
In addition, the following are included:
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t , ∀t,∀y. (5.6)











t−i+1+TDyy′ , ∀t,∀y. (5.7)
– The last term forces wyt to zero when CCU is transitioning
away from configuration y.














t−i+1+TDyy′ , ∀t. (5.8)
– The last term represents the output from the transition power-
trajectory.
Minimum up/down time constraints are omitted in this section. The
feasible set of a CCU with representation of transition ramping is defined by
constraints (5.3)–(5.8). The discussion of the tightness and compactness of
this formulation can be found in [181, Section 5.3.3].
5.6 Different Ramping Constraints
In the existing literature such as [272], both intra-configuration and
inter-configuration ramp rates are defined. However, the inter-configuration
ramp rate is only a rough proxy to the transition trajectories.
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5.6.1 Plant-wise Ramping Constraints
A set of plant-wise ramping constraints is proposed in [181, Section
5.3.3.3]:





t , ∀t, (5.9)





t , ∀t, (5.10)
where RyU and R
y
D are respectively the ramp-up and ramp-down rate limits of
configuration y when the CCU is dispatchable.
Constraints (5.9) and (5.10) assume that the ramp rate of the power-
trajectories are within the limit on the ramp rates when the CCU is dispatch-
able. If this assumption is not satisfied, additional terms are needed on the
right hand side that relax these constraints when the CCU is in transition.
5.6.2 Configuration-wise Ramping Constraints
The plant-wise ramping constraint is straightforward and easy to im-
plement. However, we notice from empirical experiences that the plant-wise
ramping constraints involve some limitations.
First, the ALLOFF configuration (the configuration indicating that
the CCU is turned off) should not be limited by ramping constraints. Under
the transition ramping model, the ALLOFF configuration would not have
a positive output except for when it is involved in transitions. However, the
output during transitions are fixed in the transition ramping. Thus, it is better
to remove the ramping constraints on the ALLOFF configurations to reduce
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the size of the problem and prevent potential conflicts in data. However, it is
not trivial to achieve this in the plant-wise ramping constraints presented in
(5.9) and (5.10).
Secondly, the power output variable and unit commitment variable of
each of the configurations in the CCU are involved in the plant-wise ramping
constraints of the CCU. This would result in more non-zeros in the constraint
matrix and increase the computational expense.




























′, y)−Hy] ∀t,∀y, (5.12)
where each entry (y′, y) in the matrix A is the power output in the last time
step in the transition curve from configuration y′ to configuration y in the CC
unit. Hy is picked as the largest output of configuration y in a time interval
during transitions to the other reachable configurations in the CC unit.
Notice that, for each configuration y, ramping constraints (5.11) and
(5.12) are equivalent to (5.9) and (5.10), respectively, when there is no tran-
sition but the terms in the summation change the ramp whenever there is a
transition.
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Constraint (5.11’) indicates the maximum power output of configura-
tion y at the start up time t is its ramp rate plus the power output in the
last time step of the transition. Constraint (5.11’) is relevant if the CCU is
ramping up in the transition. An example is the output of configuration 2 in
the transition from configuration 1 to configuration 2 between t = 5 and t = 6
as described in Fig. 5.2.
Constraint (5.12’) requires that the minimum power output of configu-
ration y at the start up time t is the power output in the last time step of the
transition minus a ramp down rate. Constraint (5.12’) is relevant if the CCU
is ramping down in the transition. An example is the output of configuration
1 at t = 13 has to be greater than or equal to the fixed output of configuration
2 at t = 12 minus the ramp down rate of configuration y as described in Fig.
5.2.
When configuration y shuts down at t, constraints (5.11) and (5.12)
become:
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Figure 5.2: Illustration of the ramping constraints with commitment variable x
and dispatchable variable w [181].
pyt−1 ≥ 0. (5.11”)
pyt−1 ≤ Hy. (5.12”)
With the transition ramping model, there shouldn’t be an active con-
straint when a configuration shuts down since the configuration is always in a
transition curve when it shuts down and the outputs in the transition curve
are fixed. Ideally, in order to have a tight formulation, Hy can be picked as
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the output of the last time step in the transition curve of the configuration
y. However, since the transition curve varies with different configurations, the
transition variables vyy
′
t for each the transition to each configuration y
′ will
be involved in the selection of Hy and it will bring nonlinearity to constraint
(5.12).
Compared to a plant-wise ramping constraint, one of the benefits of
the proposed configuration-wise ramping constraint is it creates less non-zeros
in each of the constraints. However, since the configuration-wise ramping
constraint is applied at each CCU configuration, it generates more constraints
in total. The impacts of this trade off on the problem size are presented and
further discussed in the computation results in section 5.7.
5.7 Numerical Results
An illustrative two units test case is presented in [181, Section 5.4] to
demonstrate the CCU transition ramping model. In this section, the CCU
transition ramping model described in Section 5.5.2 with two different ramp-
ing constraints described in Section 5.6 is implemented with a configuration-
component hybrid combined cycle model [98] of CCUs in the MISO system.
The computational performance of the proposed model is presented and com-
pared with the configuration-component hybrid CCU model.
MISO has collected combined cycle data from market participants since
2012 for the study of an enhanced combined cycle model [80]. These data has
been used for the study of configuration based CC model [79] and configuration-
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component hybrid CC models [98]. In total, 31 configuration based combined
cycle units are modeled using the data and there are 122 configurations under
the 31 CC units. Because of the lack of transition ramping data, a transition
ramping curve is approximated as a piece wise linear ramping curve given the
transition time and the minimum and maximum outputs of the two configu-
rations in each of the transitions. An example of the approximated transition
curve between two configurations is shown in Table 5.1. A 36-hour-ahead load
profile is randomly selected from historical load data. All test cases are per-
formed on a 2.2-GHz quad-core Intel Xeon CPU E5-2699 with 32-GB RAM;
all optimization problems are solved with Gurobi 8.0.









1CT+1ST to 2CT+1ST 3 [50, 60, 70]
2CT+1ST to 1CT+1ST 3 [70, 60, 50]
A configuration-component hybrid combined cycle model [98] is adopted
and tested with the MISO system [80]. Therefore, this hybrid combined cy-
cle model is used as benchmark to present the computation results of the
proposed formulations. Two transition ramping models with different ramp-
ing constraints are implemented in the MISO prototype day-ahead security-
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constrained unit commitment tool [133]. The computational results are com-
pared in Table 5.2.
• CCH: A configuration-component hybrid CCU model that ignores
transition rampings [98];
• CCH+TRP: CCH with transition ramping modeling and plant-wise
ramping constraints (5.9)–(5.10);
• CCH+TRC: CCH with transition ramping modeling and configuration-
wise ramping constraints (5.11)–(5.12).
In the CCU data, the transition time between configurations in some
CCUs are given zero values indicating the starting up configuration is “in-
stantly” dispatchable at the transition hour. A substitution of constants in
the ramping constraints of CCH+TRC in (5.11)–(5.12) is needed to keep the
formulation valid when the transition time is zero. While this situation is likely
to occur in practice, since the formulation is the same after the substitution
and it doesn’t affect the computations, the discussion of this issue is included
in Appendix B.
5.7.1 Computational Performance of CCU Transition Ramping Model
The objective value increases when we consider transition ramping.
This is expected because the combined cycle units are modeled as being more
flexible than they actually are if we ignore transition ramping. We assume
the energy costs during transition ramping are not included as part of the
transition costs in the current data. Therefore, we consider both energy costs
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Table 5.2: Computational Performance
Model
MIP Gap MIP Gap Root Relaxation Best
at 1200s at 1800s Time(s) Objective
CCH 0.17 % 0.10 % 122.5 12,709,826
CCH+TRP 0.28 % 0.15 % 153.4 13,012,604
CCH+TRC 0.28 % 0.15 % 169.6 13,011,413
and transition costs in the objective when a transition occurs in a combined
cycle. Since the transition cost was collected from market data without the
explicit consideration of transition ramping, it may include some incremental
energy costs during the transitions. Therefore, the objective with the transi-
tion ramping model may be less than what is shown in Table 5.2 when accurate
data is obtained.
In addition, the “root relaxation” [163] time increases when transition
ramping is included. This is because the problem size grows when we introduce
the variables and constraints related to transition ramping. As a result, the
integer relaxation of the UC problem becomes harder to solve.
Despite the increased problem size, computational performance of the
models with transition ramping are close to the model without transition ramp-
ing. As shown in Table 5.2, the MIP gaps of the two models with transition
ramping are only slightly higher than the benchmark model. According to the
MISO operating guide, the day-ahead optimization will be stopped at 1200
second if the MIP gap is below 1%; if the MIP gap is above 1%, the optimiza-
tion will continue for another 600 seconds. From Table 5.2, we find that the
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MIP gaps of CCH+TRP and CCH+TRC are very close to the MIP gap of
CCH at 1800 seconds and all three models have MIP gaps below 0.2%; that
is, the results of all three models can be considered acceptable. This suggests
that introducing transition ramping modeling in [181] does not significantly
increase the computational complexity.
5.7.2 Problem Sizes with Different Ramping Constraints
Table 5.3: Problem Size
Problem Size CCH CCH+TRP CCH+TRC
Original Problem
# of nonzero 4,622,554 4,656,582 4,668,482
After Pre-solve
# of nonzeros 2,704,544 2,789,274 2,769,778
# of continuous variables. 297,451 298,140 298,093
# of integer variables 74,251 75,074 74,499
Next, we compare two formulations of ramping constraints. Table 5.2
shows that the MIP gaps of CCH+TRC and CCH+TRP at both 1200s and
1800s are very close (below 0.01%). Table 5.3 shows that CCH+TRC re-
sults in more non-zeros before pre-solving. As mentioned in Section 5.6.2,
configuration-wise ramping constraints lead to an increased number of con-
straints. For this test system, we observe that the configuration-wise ramping
constraints (CCH+TRC) lead to more nonzeros than the plant-wise ramping
constraints.
After pre-solving, however, the number of nonzeros in CCH+TRC be-
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comes less than that in CCH+TRP; the number of variables in CCH+TRC also
becomes smaller than CCH+TRP. Although it is difficult to identify the cause
of such differences, it is reasonable to speculate that, since each configuration-
wise ramping constraint involves less variables and parameters, this alternative
formulation enables the pre-solving process to identify more redundancy. Al-
though more test cases are needed to have a comprehensive conclusion, results
from this study show that modeling the ramping constraints on the configu-
rations in a CCU transition ramping model will potentially provide a smaller
problem.
5.8 Summary
Most existing combined-cycle unit (CCU) models assume that any tran-
sition completes within a single interval. This assumption is not satisfied
by the operating characteristics of most CCUs, and may lead to suboptimal
commitment and dispatch solutions. This chapter first summarizes a mixed-
integer programming formulation that represents the transition ramping of
CCUs [181]. Configuration-wise ramping constraints are formulated and com-
pared with the plant-wise ramping constraints in [181]. The transition ramp-
ing model is implemented with configuration-component hybrid CC model in
a MISO prototype UC tool. Computational results on a MISO system show a
moderate increase in computational complexity when transition ramping mod-
eling is considered. The problem sizes of the transition ramping model with
different ramping constraints are presented and discussed.
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Chapter 6
Pumped-Storage Hydro Unit Formulation
6.1 Introduction
Inspired by the work on modeling the configurations of combined cycle
units in the unit commitment problem, this chapter proposes a configuration
based pumped-storage hydro (PSH) model for the day-ahead market, in or-
der to enhance the use of pumped-storage hydro resources in the system. By
introducing three “configurations,” namely, pumping, generating and “alloff”
or off-line, in a pumped-storage hydro unit, the proposed model can more ac-
curately reflect the practical operations of pumped-storage hydro units in the
day-ahead market. A comprehensive review of the existing pumped-storage
hydro models and industry practices is presented. The definition of configura-
tions of a pumped-storage hydro unit and the transitions between the config-
urations during operation are revealed and discussed in detail to describe the
proposed model.
6.2 Background and Motivation
Pumped-storage hydro plants use power to pump water uphill to an
elevated reservoir when the electricity price is low. The water is released
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to a lower reservoir and drives the turbine to generate electricity when it is
needed. There are now 22.8 GW of pumped-storage capacities in the United
States [404]. However, it becomes harder to obtain significant land area with
suitable topography for reservoirs not only because many of the best sites are
taken, but also due to the opposition from environmental groups. Significant
investment and long lead times are important factors limiting further deploy-
ment of conventional pumped-storage hydro plants [343].
In the traditional operation of a power system, energy storage has been
treated as a way to shave peaks and improve the capacity factor of base-load
generation. However, there are a range of energy storage technologies that have
been developed that can also provide value by supplying ancillary services such
as reserves and frequency control. Therefore, the energy storage unit is not
only playing the role of shifting load and generation but also playing a much
broader role as an extended and flexible energy management tool.
The effects of stockpiling excess electricity in energy storage has histor-
ically been used to avoid the need for some of the peaking generation capacity
and also enables more base-load generators to stay on line and generate elec-
tricity in the time when demand is low, thereby lowering the system overall
operation cost. For example, with energy storage, more base-load generators
are able to keep generating in the night with their low cost and avoid the costs
of shutting down and starting up. The costs of peaking generation is thereby
also avoided.
This load/generation-shifting effects is also particularly useful for en-
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hancing the integration of renewable generation plants. In the past two decades,
because of the concerns about the environmental impacts of generating elec-
tricity by burning fossil fuels, there are enormous interests and ambitious tar-
gets for integrating renewable energy to supply the electricity demand. The
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function of energy stockpiling provided by energy storage units would allow
renewable resources to get more value in daily operation.
As shown in Table 6.1, as one of the mature technologies for energy
storage, pumped-storage hydro is able to provide service in a time range from
minutes to days. The services in this time range include spinning reserve and
load or generation shifting.
On the one hand, pumped-storage hydro can, in principle, provide a
wide range of important and valuable services to the system which, nowadays,
is exposed to a greater scale of uncertainties on both generation and demand
sides. On the other hand, however, the pumped-storage hydro units have not
deeply participated in the market. Currently, many of the pumped-storage hy-
dro units in the footprint of the Midcontinent Independent System Operator
(MISO) do not participate in the day-ahead market clearing process. There-
fore, their decisions of whether to pump or generate and how much to pump
or generate are made under their own forecast of market prices.
This practice of pumped-storage hydro technology is not efficient in
two aspects: First, as a market participant with limited information about
the market, the forecast of market prices can deviate significantly from the
realization. Therefore, the decisions made based on the forecast would impair
profits for the pumped-storage hydro units in long-term and this would dis-
courage the further development and investment in the pumped-storage hydro
technology; Secondly, the decisions made by pumped-storage hydro unit is
also suboptimal to the system welfare. That is, the benefits and the flexibility
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provided by pumped-storage hydro technology is not fully exploited under the
current practice.
To overcome the drawbacks of the current practice, introducing the
pumped-storage hydro units into MISO’s day-ahead unit commitment model
is a first step. Therefore, a suitable model for pumped-storage hydro units in
the UC model is studied in this chapter.
6.3 Literature Review
6.3.1 Pumped-storage Hydro Units
Because of the benefits of renewable power smoothing provided by
pumped-storage units introduced in Table 6.1, the model of a pumped-storage
unit has been explicitly developed in the operation of a renewable plus pumped-
storage power plant. For example, in [66] and [118], a profit maximization
problem is formulated for a single wind farm together with a pumped-storage
hydro plant. A wind plus storage plant model is presented in [213]. This gen-
eral energy storage model is similar to [66]. In these works, a pumped-storage
plant is modeled as two individual units: a pump and a generator. Both
pumping and generating have upper and lower limits for every time slot. In
addition, generation at every time slot is upper bounded by the total energy
stored in the system. The energy stored in the pumped-storage hydro system
is modeled as an energy balance constraint with efficiencies for pumping and
generating. The total energy stored in the first hour and the last hour is spec-
ified. The energy stored in the system is greater than or equal to zero and less
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than or equal to its upper limit in all hours. This upper limit represents the
maximum energy stored in the system and is derived from the water stored in
the reservoir.
The impact of energy storage sizing on wind-hydro system operation
and economics has been studied in [67], [213] and [56]. A general energy
storage model is defined by its energy capacity, charging efficiency, discharging
efficiency, charging power capacity, and discharging power capacity.
In [56], the pumped-storage plant is modeled in a similar way as to
[66] but considers the constraints of meeting spinning reserve requirements or
frequency regulation unit commitment requirements. Consequently, the model
allows the possibility of spilling water without using it to generate electricity
by including a variable for spilled energy in the pumped-storage hydro energy
balance constraints.
The bidding and scheduling of a pumped-storage unit is studied as
part of a generating company with hydro, thermal, and pumped-storage units
in [288]. The quantity of pumping and generating is modeled in a single
variable representing water discharged (positive) from or pumped (negative) to
the upper reservoir assuming one hundred percent efficiency in both processes.
The robust unit commitment problem with wind power and pumped-
storage hydro is studied in [196]. A binary variable is introduced to indi-
cate whether the unit absorbs (pumping) or generates electricity. The big-M
method is used to prevent the unit from generating and pumping at the same
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time.
In [145], stochastic joint optimization is used to maximize the profit
of wind generation and pumped-storage units in an electricity market. In
[145], each pumped-storage unit is modeled as N identical turbines and each
of them can function as either a generator or a pump. An integer variable
is introduced to indicate the total number of turbines that are in pumping
mode among the N identical turbines in the pumped-storage hydro unit. The
generating / pumping mutually exclusive constraint is well handled with the
integer variables without using the big-M method. In addition, the start up
and shut down costs are considered in this study.
The feasibility of combined solar pumped-storage hydro and solar wind
pumped-storage hydro is studied in [249] and [248]. Because the studies focus
on the standalone island condition, they provide a way to model the energy
stored in the system with a consideration of the available static head in the
studied island and how much water volume is used for pumping or generating.
Also, the water evaporation and leakage loss are considered in their work.
Although the model of a pumped-storage hydro unit has been studied
in the operation of a renewable plus pumped-storage hydro plant explicitly,
the model of a pumped-storage hydro unit in the day-ahead unit commitment
problem remained obscure. In [66], [118], [213], [67], [56] and [288], the market
prices are taken as an input for the plants’ profit maximization problem and
the generating/pumping level of each unit is defined as a continuous variable.
A binary variable is introduced in [196] to represent the generating/pumping
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status of a pumped-storage hydro unit in the system. The binary variables
for a pumped-storage hydro unit is split into N pairs for each pumped-storage
hydro turbine in [145]. References [248] and [249] focused on the study in an
island mode, therefore the dispatching of pumped-storage hydro unit in the
power system is not their major concern.
In the above works, the pumped-storage hydro unit has to be either
pumping or generating at a given time. However, due to the physical limits
from pumping/generating turbines, there are usually minimum outputs for the
generating mode and minimum consumptions for the pumping mode. These
model features imply that, a pumped-storage hydro unit is forced to operate
at one of the two limits in some cases if the current model is used in a unit
commitment and economic dispatch problem. These conditions would result
in inefficient operations. That is, because of the minimum limits of genera-
tion and consumption, the pumped-storage hydro unit is either generating or
pumping at least at its minimum output or consumption limit, respectively,
if it is operating. However, at certain times in the day it may be best to
neither pump or generate. In other words, constantly charging or discharg-
ing the pumped-storage hydro unit is not always the best strategy for system
operation.
In [202], the coordinated hourly scheduling of wind and pumped-storage
units is modeled in the problem of day-ahead scheduling of power systems.
Three modes, pumping, generating, and idle are modeled for each of the
pump storage units. However, without explicitly modeling the transition of
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the modes, it is not clear how to include some operation features e.g. transi-
tion time between modes and min up/down time for each mode. In [202], the
transition between modes are assumed to be able to complete within one time
interval. Nevertheless, this is not a general case, particularly in the context of
real-time markets where the interval may be only five or fifteen minutes.
In order to represent the operational features of pumped-storage hydro
in a day-ahead market, we explored the model used for combined cycle gas
turbines (CCGTs) in the unit commitment problem and found the configura-
tion based model used for CCGTs [79] and [181] can be extended to better
represent a pumped-storage hydro unit in the day-ahead market.
6.3.2 Combined Cycle Gas Turbines
We find the CCU configuration based model described in [79], [48], [189]
and [181, Section 5.4] is particularly fit for the operation of a pumped-storage
hydro unit. In the configuration based model of a CCU, the configurations
which are different combinations of CTs/STs are modeled as individual units.
Besides all the operational configurations, there is an “alloff” configuration in-
dicating the off state of the plant. All the configurations including the “alloff”
configurations are mutually exclusive indicating that there is only one configu-
ration on at any time of the operation of the plant. Therefore, the complicated
operations, such as operation costs, output limits and feasibility of transitions
between configurations, can be specifically dealt with.
Similar to CCGTs, a pumped-storage hydro unit can also be modeled
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with two operational configurations namely pumping and generating. In or-
der to allow the unit to stay idle (neither pumping or generating), an “alloff”
configuration can be introduced as with the CCGT. The transition between dif-
ferent modes are modeled using transition variables. Thus the operational fea-
tures such as the constraints on transition time between modes, min up/down
time of each mode can be handled well. In addition, compared to the model
in [202], the configuration based pumped-storage hydro model is more scalable.
It can be easily extended if necessary to have operational modes considering
different components in a pump hydro unit as discussed in [145], which poten-
tially can provide more flexibility to the operation of a pumped-storage hydro
unit.
The other CCGT models besides the configuration based model are less
suitable for modeling PSH. For example, the aggregate model is not applicable
for a pumped-storage hydro unit because the pumping/generating operation
features cannot be represented. The other models discussed in [98] are designed
to address the operational features of individual turbines in a configuration,
e.g., min up/down time of each ST or CT in a 1CT+1ST configuration etc.
However, the operation configuration in a pumped-storage hydro unit would
be composed from a single unit or a group of identical units operating in the
same mode. Therefore, it is not necessary to explicitly distinguish each of the
units in a configuration of a pumped-storage hydro model.
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6.3.3 Contributions
In order to accurately represent the operation features of a pumped-
storage hydro unit in day-ahead market, we extend the configuration based
model in [79] with a representation of operation features of a pumped-storage
hydro unit to propose a novel configuration based pumped-storage hydro model
in this chapter. The contributions are:
• The proposed model can reflect the physical features accurately and
enhance the operational flexibility of a pumped-storage hydro unit
by introducing an additional “alloff” configuration.
• A numerical example is presented to demonstrate the effectiveness
of the proposed pumped-storage hydro model. The impacts of bid
prices for pump loads on the pumped-storage hydro owner’s profits
and system social welfare are discussed in the case study.
• The implementation of the proposed pumped-storage hydro formu-
lation and a computational study in a MISO prototype unit commit-
ment model is ongoing.
6.4 Problem Formulation
The configuration based modeling of pumped-storage hydro unit repre-
sents all feasible operation modes of a pumped-storage hydro unit. We assume
that, at each pumped-storage hydro unit, either there is only one pumping and
one generating turbine or there are multiple identical turbines. Based on this
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Figure 6.1: Mode transition diagram of a pumped-storage hydro unit in two con-
secutive periods.
assumption, there are only three operation modes in each of the turbines in a
pumped-storage hydro unit and transitions are allowed between each pair of
the modes, as shown in Fig. 6.1. The “Mode 0” represents the state when the
pumped-storage hydro turbine is offline.
Nomenclature
Sets and indices:
g ∈ Gsh set of pumped-storage hydro units;
g ∈ Gsh,r set of pumped-storage hydro units that share the same
reservoir r;
g ∈ G set of rest of generating units;
m ∈Mg set of configurations, m = 0 :all off,
m = s : storage / pumping,
m = h : hydro / generating ;
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n ∈MF,mg set of configurations that configuration m can feasibly transit
to;
r ∈ R set of reservoirs.
Data [units]:
Dt system demand at period t [$/MW];
P hgt minimum power output of configuration h at unit g at period
t in economic mode [MW];
P
h
gt maximum power output of configuration h at unit g at period
t in economic mode [MW];
P sgt minimum power storage of configuration s at unit g at period
t in economic mode [MW];
P
s
gt maximum power storage of configuration s at unit g at period
t in economic mode [MW];
ηsg pumping efficiency of the pumped-storage hydro unit g [NA];
ηhg generating efficiency of the pumped-storage hydro unit g [NA];
Er,1 initial energy levels of the reservoir r [MW];
Er,T+1 final energy levels of the reservoir r [MW];
Er maximum energy levels of the reservoir r [MW].
Variables [units]:
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er,t energy stored in the reservoir r at time t [MW];
umgt binary variable, commitment variable of unit g configuration
m at period t [NA];
vmngt binary variable, transition variable between configuration m
and configuration n of generator g at period t [NA];
qhgt continuous variable, amount of energy production of
configuration h at unit g at time period t [MW];
qsgt continuous variable, amount of energy consumed in
configuration s at unit g at time period t [MW];
qgt continuous variable, amount of energy production of other
generating unit g at time period t [MW].
Derived Data [units]:
Hk,hgt the piecewise cost of the k
th segment of piecewise
approximation of the production cost or bid price of
configuration h at generator g at period t [$/MW];
P k,hgt the break point of the k
th segment of piecewise approximation
of the production cost of configuration h at generator g at
period t [MW].
Csg,t the bid pumping price of unit g at time t [$/MW].
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Auxiliary Variables [units]:
fhgt continuous variable, energy cost of h configuration at unit of
configuration at unit of s configuration of unit g at period t
[$ /hr];
C(qgt) cost function of generating unit g [$ /hr].
6.4.1 Objective Function
The objective of the day-ahead unit commitment problem is to mini-
mize the system operating costs. The operation costs related to a pumped-
storage hydro unit is the offer costs of the generating mode minus the bid
prices of the pumping mode which is reflected as negative costs in (6.1). Note
that the offer costs and bid prices from a PSH can be zero. The third term in













6.4.2 Piece-wise Costs Function
The operation costs of the generating mode of a pumped-storage hydro
unit is modeled as a piece-wise linear function in (6.2). Notice that this is
a generalized way to represent the production cost of a generating unit, and
that the generation costs from a PSH unit could be zero.
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∀k = 1, ..., K,∀g ∈ Gsh,∀t ∈ T
(6.2)
6.4.3 System Energy Balance Constraints
The generation has to be balanced with demand in the system at all
time. In (6.3), the total generation in the system including the generation
from pumped-storage hydro units on the left should be balanced with the sum
of the fixed demand and the pumping demand from the pumped-storage hydro





qhgt = Dt +
∑
g∈Gsh
qsgt ∀t ∈ T (6.3)
6.4.4 State and Transition Logic Constraints
Constraints (6.4) guarantee that the unit commitment variables of each
mode in a pumped-storage hydro plant described in Fig. 6.1 are mutually
exclusive, which is also modeled for CCGTs in [238]:
∑
m∈Mg
umgt = 1 ∀g ∈ Gsh, ∀t ∈ T (6.4)
The transition between two modes m,n in one pumped-storage hydro
plant g at time t is defined as a binary variable vmngt . Notice that the start up
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and shut down of a mode are modeled as the transition between the mode and
the “alloff” mode. These constraints are modeled for CCGTs in [272].







∀g ∈ Gsh, ∀m ∈M, ∀t ∈ T
(6.5)
In addition to the mutually exclusive constraints on commitment vari-







∀g ∈ Gsh,∀t ∈ T
(6.6)
6.4.5 Box constraints
The amount of generation at each time from the pumped-storage hydro
unit is constrained not only by the physical features of the turbine but also
by the amount of energy stored in the system as shown in (6.7). However, the
right side of the inequality is a product of a binary variable and the minimum
of a constant and a continuous variable. The linearization of this constraint is
shown in Appendix A. The amount of energy stored in the pumped-storage
hydro system is only limited by the features of the turbine as shown in (6.8).
P hgu
h










gt ≤ qsg,t ≤ usgtP
s
g ∀g ∈ Gsh ∀t ∈ T (6.8)
6.4.6 Storage Energy Balance and State of Charge Constraints
The energy stored in a reservoir shared by multiple pumped-storage
hydro units is balanced at each consecutive hour shown in (6.9). Parameters ηhg
and ηsg are the efficiencies of generating and pumping indicating energy losses
in both modes. The energy stored in the reservoir at the beginning of each day
is given by (6.10) and the energy stored in the reservoir at the end of each day
is constrained in (6.11). The inequalities in (6.12) constrain the total energy
stored in the reservoir at each time interval. These constraints are modeled in
a pumped-storage hydro unit based on [66], [118], [213], [67], [56], [288], [196]
and [145].










∀r ∈ R ∀t ∈ T (6.9)
er,1 = Er,1 ∀r ∈ R (6.10)
er,T+1 = Er,T+1 ∀r ∈ R (6.11)
Er ≤ er,t ≤ Er ∀r ∈ R ∀t ∈ T (6.12)
The start up/down time, transition time and the minimum up/down
time are not listed here. They can be easily handled by the configuration
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based model. The security constraints are not included, the details can be
found in [79].
6.5 Numerical Results
Table 6.2 shows the units considered in this case study. Two thermal
generators with different capacities and different costs are included to repre-
sent the generations besides pumped-storage hydro units in the system and
to generate prices. The two pumped-storage hydro units in a pumped-storage
hydro plant namely PSH1 and PSH2 share a reservoir. The bid prices for
pumping load are initially specified as 27$/MWh and there are no generating
costs for both units. We will further discuss the impacts of the bidding price
to the social welfare of the system in this chapter. For a simple presentation,
the marginal generation costs and bid prices are constants over feasible gen-
eration and consumption levels and independent of time for all units. Notice
that pumping in both units are “block loads” meaning that the pumping load
is either at a predetermined level or zero. This is a typical operating feature
of the pumped-storage hydro units in the MISO system. The energy efficiency
of the pumping and generating processes are identical in both units.
The minimum and maximum energy allowed to be stored in the reser-
voir along with the state of charge of the reservoir at the beginning and the end
time interval are described in Table 6.3. Notice that the state of charge at the
end time interval is required to equal that at the beginning time interval, any
energy used for generations from the pumped-storage hydro has to be stored
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Table 6.2: Unit Parameters
Unit
Cost/Price qm qm ηmg
$/MWh MW MW
1: PSH1 Pump 27 200 200 0.9
2: PSH1 Gen 0 100 200 0.9
3: PSH2 Pump 27 200 200 0.9
4: PSH2 Gen 0 100 200 0.9
5: Thermal Gen 1 30 0 400 NA
6: Thermal Gen 2 20 0 900 NA
earlier or recharged later within the studied time range.
Table 6.3: Reservoir
Er Er Er,1 Er,T+1
MWh MWh MWh MWh
Reservoir 350 3500 1000 1000
A day ahead unit commitment (UC) and economic dispatch (ED) prob-
lem is solved with a 24 hours net-load scenario in the system. Reserve require-
ments, ramp constraints, and transmission security constraints are ignored in
the problem. The energy price at each node in the transmission network or
locational marginal price (LMP) is the dual value at the energy balance con-
straint in (6.3) after the problem been solved. Notice that, since there is no
transmission network constraint in this case study, there is a single LMP for
the whole system at each time interval.
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6.5.1 Bid Price for Pump Load
The bid prices for pump loads submitted by the pumped-storage unit
owners represent their willingness to purchase and consume the electricity in
the pumping modes. However, the bid prices are calculated based on the
owner’s information and forecast of the system LMP that would likely to be
deviate from a realization. Thus, the bid prices will cause the solution of
the UC and ED problem to deviate from maximizing social welfare. The
compromised system objective by the pump bid prices will in turn impair the
benefits to the pumped-storage hydro unit owners.
Figure 6.2: Unit Dispatches with Bid Prices for Pump Loads.
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Net-load is defined in the section as the system constant load minus
the renewable generations not including pumped-storage hydro (PSH). Fig.
6.2 shows the UC and ED solutions of the dispatches of the two pumped-
storage units on top of the system net-load when bid prices for pump loads
are considered and set to 27$/MWh as shown in Table 6.2.
The net-load is an emulation of the California “Duck Curve” where
solar generation boosts in the middle of the day and creates a deep drop in
the net-load. The LMP is therefore lower and the PSH units are expected
to pump in those hours (11-15). However, we observed that there are several
hours (1,3-10,16,21-23) when one PSH unit is pumping and the other PSH
unit is generating. Fig. 6.3 shows the outputs of PSH units on top of the state
of charge of the reservoir. We can observe that at the hours when the PSH
units pump and generate at the same time (particularly hours between 3-10),
PSH units gradually deplete the state of charge of the reservoir by their round
loop efficiency.
The simultaneous pumping and generating is due to the non-zero bid
prices for pumping. In particular, because a positive bid price is submitted
and included in the objective of the problem in (6.1) (boxed term), the system
encourages PSH units to pump to reduce the objective function. At the same
time, the generation and pump loads of the PSH appear at the left and right
side of (6.3) (boxed terms). Because the generation cost from the PSH unit
is zero, the “free” generation from one PSH unit will balance the pumping
load from the other PSH unit as indicated in (6.3). The results shown in this
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Figure 6.3: Reservoir State of Charges with Bid Prices for Pump Loads.



















qhgt = Dt +
∑
g∈Gsh
qsgt ∀t ∈ T (6.3)
148
6.5.2 Eliminate Bid Price for Pump Loads
Alternatively, we suggest to eliminate the bid price for pump loads from
the system objective as shown in (6.1’). Assuming the non-water generation
costs for a PSH unit is zero, the objective only contains the generation costs of
the rest of the generators besides the PSHs in the system. The price charged








With the updated objective, the dispatch solutions are presented in
Fig. 6.4. The first change we observe is that the PSH units no longer pump
and generate at a same time interval. Pumping from PSH units appears at
midnight (hour 0-4) and middle of the day (hour 10-14 and 16) when the net
load is low. The PSH units are dispatched to generate at morning peak (hour
8) and evening peak (hour 17-20) when the net load is high. The PSH units
don’t pump at every time interval when net-load is low because the state of
charge in the reservoir at the end of the day is required to return to its initial
level.
First, from the system operator point of view, the results in Fig. 6.4
show the effectiveness of pump hydro storage units shaving the peak and filling
the sink of the net-load shape. Therefore, the PSH units positively contribute
to reduce the system generation costs and to maximize the social welfare. A
flatter net-load including the outputs from the PSH units is also good for
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Figure 6.4: Unit Dispatches with Bid Prices for Pump Loads Eliminated.
relieving the system and preventing generation shortage and price spikes.
Second, in Fig. 6.4, it is clearly observed that PSH units pump when
the net-load is low corresponding to a lower LMP when pumping. So, the PSH
units will be charged less for their pumping load. In contrast, it is also clear
that PSH units generate when the net-load is high corresponding to a higher
LMP when the hydro generating. The PSH units will be paid more for their
generations in those time intervals. After the bid prices for pump loads been
removed, the PSH owners should expect higher profits.
In Table 6.4, the PSH owner’s profits are further compared to the so-
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Table 6.4: PSH Owner Profits and Social Welfare
With non-zero pump bid price With zero pump bid price
$ $
PSH Profits -32,000 1,160
System Costs 402,048 380,858
lutions where positive bid prices for pump loads are considered. From Table
6.2, the bid price for pump loads in this study is 27$/MWh. It falls into the
range between the cost of the two thermal generators and it is a reasonable
price that a PSH owner might bid in this system.
The results show that the bid prices for the pump loads can cause
wrong incentives in the problem and result in lost profits for PSH owners.
The system generation costs represent the social welfare in the UC and ED
problem. Therefore, the wrong incentives caused by the bid prices for pump
loads lead the problem to a solution that deviates from the maximum social
welfare. As shown in Table 6.4, after we eliminate the bid prices for pump
loads, both the PSH owners’ profits and the social welfare are improved.
The reservoir state of charge is presented in Fig 6.5. It is straightfor-
ward to see that the PSH units store energy into the reservoir at the beginning
and the middle of the day and charge the reservoir in the evening. The move-
ment of the stored energy in the reservoir is also a demonstration that social
welfare is maintained.
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Figure 6.5: Reservoir State of Charges with Bid Prices for Pump Loads Eliminated.
6.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis on the Generation and Pump Efficiencies
In this section, we discuss the effects of efficiency lost at generation
and pump modes in a PSHU to the dispatch solutions in the unit commitment
problem. The formulation that removes the non-zero bid prices for pump load
described in Section 6.5.2 is used in this study. The parameters for the case
study remain the same from Table 6.2 except for the efficiency at PSH1 which
is highlighted in Table 6.5.
With the changed efficiency at PSH1 in Table 6.5, PSH1 has a lower
pumping efficiency and a higher generating efficiency compare to PSH2 while
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Table 6.5: Unit Parameters
Unit
Cost/Price qm qm ηmg
$/MWh MW MW
1: PSH1 Pump 27 200 200 0.81
2: PSH1 Gen 0 100 200 1
3: PSH2 Pump 27 200 200 0.9
4: PSH2 Gen 0 100 200 0.9
the round loop efficiency for both units are still the same.
Figure 6.6: Reservoir State of Charges with Sensitivity Analysis on PSH Efficien-
cies.
Figure 6.6 shows the state of charges of the reservoir in dispatch results.
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We observe that PSH1 only generates and all the pump loads are from unit
PSH2. The results indicate that the system is using the best of the high
efficiencies of pump at PSH1 and generation at PSH2. Therefore, the system
objective is reduced to $378,436. The profits of the PSH units would be
increased if both units belong to a single owner for the same reason. However,
if the two units belong to two separate owners, then the PSH1 would make
more profits by its high efficient generation and PSH2 may lose profits because
its high efficient pump even if their round loop efficiencies are the same.
In the proposed formulation, we removed the generation costs and bid
prices of a pumped-storage hydro unit in the objective function as discussed
in Section 6.5.1 and Section 6.5.2. Then the only cost from a pumped-storage
hydro unit in the proposed model is from its efficiency lost presented in the
state of charge constraints in (6.9). This accurately reflects the operational
characteristics of a pumped-storage unit and serve the purpose of maximizing
the social welfare. The sensitivity analysis in this section also shows that the
proposed formulation creates incentives for the owners who share a reservoir to
install PSH units with a high generation efficiency and a low pump efficiency.
6.6 Summary
In this chapter, a configuration based pumped-storage hydro model in
the day-ahead market is presented. Because of the pump “block load” feature
and the minimum limit of the generations, the operation of a pump storage
hydro unit is difficult to fit into a model that requires the unit to be either
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pumping or generating at any given time. Introducing the three configurations
model with generating, pumping, and “alloff” configurations can resolve this
issue. In addition, the proposed formulation is flexible to model the transition
between any pair of configurations if the transition takes more than one time
interval or incurs with additional costs.
A numerical study is presented with two identical PSH units in a PSH
plant sharing a reservoir. The effectiveness of the pumped-storage hydro
units in the proposed model are demonstrated with examples. The bid prices
for pump loads are discussed. The disadvantages of including positive bid
prices for pump loads and their negative effects on social welfare are presented
with quantified simulation results. Sensitivity analysis on the efficiency of a
pumped-hydro unit is presented.
The implementation of the proposed formulation in a MISO prototype
UC model is ongoing. Future work will be done with case studies in the MISO
system. The compactness of the formulation will be further discussed and the
computational results will be presented with MISO large case studies.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
This dissertation has proposed mixed-integer programming formula-
tions of two power system problems, namely the interdiction problem and the
unit commitment problem. We present the conclusion in two sections, each
correspond to a part of this dissertation.
7.1 Interdiction Problem
7.1.1 Cascading Outage Analysis (COA)
Comprehensive outage studies in power systems are described before
the presentation of an interdiction problem. An enhanced COA model is il-
lustrated in a case study of a test system. The model provides a way to
evaluate the short term impacts of an attack, e.g. the amount of short-term
load shed. The COA model applies four outage checkers, namely Transient
Stability Checker, Frequency Outage Checker, Overload Outage Checker, and
Voltage Outage Checker to simulate the system behavior after an initial distur-
bance, i.e. an attack. The contributions of this work are as follows. First, the
cascading outage analysis model is converted to the Python environment and
it is easier to connect the COA to other models or other software. Second, the
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current COA code is fully automated and can directly read initiating events
from a database, modify the case study, and run transient and steady state
analysis. Third, the frequency checker (as under and over frequency protec-
tion relays) is incorporated into the transient analysis. It gives two advantages
to the model, namely, actual frequency response is used by relays instead of
system wide approximation, and since it is part of the transient analysis, if
the protection relay takes any action, the impact of that action on transient
analysis is automatically considered.
Nevertheless, the cascading outage analysis still has several limitations.
Potential improvements include:
• The cascading outage analysis model uses a set of predetermined pa-
rameters and settings for protection devices. In the industry applica-
tions, different coordinations and settings among various protection
schemes may lead to different system behavior.
• There are some control schemes in power systems, including con-
trolled islanding schemes and automatic tap changers, etc that are
not modeled in the cascading outage analysis tool. These sophisti-
cated models could be incorporated and studied to make the simu-
lation results more reflective of reality.
7.1.2 Cyber Attack
Using the developed COA model, different cyber attacks in power
sytems have been studied. From the simulation results of cyber attacks tar-
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geted on grid control centers, we find that the number of transmission lines
outaged at a given voltage level in the attacked TDSP is critical as a predictor
of algorithmic non-convergence. There exists a threshold at each voltage level
such that an algorithmic non-convergence will occur when the attacked TDSP
has more branches tripped than the threshold. We also observe that if the
system survives from the contingency, then an attack on a TDSP with more
branches at the lower voltage levels would cause more load lost.
We simulated of IoT demand increase attacks at different scales includ-
ing a 1% of load increase attack, a 10% of sudden load increase attack and
a 30% of sudden load increase attack. The simulation shows the actions of
UFLS and over frequency protection are sufficient to prevent an immediate
system failure or cascading failures in the transmission system in short time
scales after the attack. Additional actions may be needed at longer time scales
after a 30% load increase attack to restore the stable operation of the system,
but a system blackout will likely not occur in these situations.
In addition, a “frequency swing attack” is defined as a cycle of load
increase and decrease IoT attack that aims to push the frequency swing to vio-
late the frequency protection thresholds in the system. However, the frequency
swing attack doesn’t show an ability to cause an immediate disconnection of
generators. A possible repeated frequency swing attack has been discussed.
The impacts of depleting the UFLS resources are discussed. The analysis
shows the effectiveness of such attack would be impacted by any additional
frequency protection measures in the system.
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The cyber attack simulations have certain limitations and future work
can be done to extend this work:
• The results from transient simulations can be more precise if a de-
tailed transient data for a large system becomes available.
• The protections considered in this study is a subset of the protections
in power systems that would contribute to a cascading outage after
a disturbance in the system. However, future work can be done
to explore the impacts from other protections that are commonly
equipped in the power systems.
• In the study of IoT demand attacks, we considered only an IoT
demand attack that is evenly distributed across all the load points
in the system. However, in the future work, we will consider IoT
demand attacks targeting only a part of the system.
7.1.3 Interdiction Problem with COA Model
Based on the knowledge learned from the comprehensive study of cas-
cading outages and cyber attacks in power systems, an interdiction problem
is reformulated to include the COA model to consider the short-term impacts
of attacks. The Global Benders Decomposition method with the COA model
as the sub-problem is implemented in a 37 bus test system. Because of the
cascading effects, it is difficult to find valid Bender’s cuts. However, with a
good “importance” measurement for elements in the master problem, it is still
feasible to find a close to optimal solution.
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We discovered some approximate linear correlations between the total
disrupted power flows in an attack and the load lost post attack under the
simulation with COA model. A similar correlation is observed in the 37 Bus
system. This correlation is used for generating Bender’s cuts in the GLBD
algorithm. Case studies and tests in the 37 Bus system shown the efficiency
of the proposed method. The computational effects of the proposed method
is discussed.
7.2 Unit Commitment Problem
7.2.1 Combined Cycle Unit Formulation
A mixed-integer programming formulation that represents the transi-
tion ramping of CCUs and removes an invalid assumption of single interval
transition is summarized from [181]. Configuration-wise ramping constraints
are formulated and compared with the plant-wise ramping constraints that
were developed in [181]. The transition ramping model is implemented with
configuration-component hybrid CC model in a MISO prototype UC tool.
Computational results on a MISO system show a moderate increase in com-
putational complexity when transition ramping modeling is considered. The
problem sizes of the transition ramping model with different ramping con-
straints are presented and discussed.
Although the formulation and discussion of the transition ramping
model in this dissertation are dedicated to a combined cycle unit, they can
be extended and applied to the modeling of units with similar features in the
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system. This will be discussed for pumped-storage hydro.
7.2.2 Pumped Storage Hydro Unit
A configuration based pumped storage hydro model in the day-ahead
market is presented. Because of the pump “block load” feature and the min-
imum limit of the generations, the operation of a pump storage hydro unit
is difficult to fit into a model that requires the unit to be either pumping or
generating at a given time. Introducing the three configurations model with
generating, pumping and “alloff” configurations can resolve this issue. In ad-
dition, the proposed formulation is flexible to model the transition between
any pair of configurations if the transition takes more than one time interval
or involves additional costs.
A numerical study is presented with two identical PSH units in a PSH
plant sharing a reservoir. The effectiveness of the pumped storage hydro units
in the proposed model are demonstrated with examples. The disadvantages of
including positive bid prices for pump loads and their negative effects on social
welfare are discussed with quantified simulation results. Sensitivity analysis
on the efficiency of a pumped-hydro unit is discussed.
The implementation of the proposed formulation in a MISO prototype
UC model is ongoing. Future work will be done with case studies in the MISO
system. The compactness of the formulation will be further discussed and the





Capacity Constraints at Pumped Storage
Hydro Model
We formalize the linerization of the capacity constraint for a pumped
storage hydro unit in the following remark.
Remark 1. By definition of efficiency, ηhg ≥ 0. Note that eg,t ≥ 0 from (6.12).
Then, the capacity constraints described in the right-hand side of (6.7) is














g,t ≤ ηhg er,t ∀r ∈ R ∀g ∈ Gsh,r ∀t ∈ T (A.2)
Proof of Remark 1
Linearize (A.1) to (A.2) is a standard linearization on a minimum oper-
ation and it is straightforward. The proof would show the equivalence between
right-hand side of (6.7) and (A.1).









g er,t} ∀r ∈ R ∀g ∈ Gsh,r ∀t ∈ T,
uhgt = 0:
right-hand side of (6.7) ⇒ qhg,t ≤ 0 ∀r ∈ R ∀g ∈ Gsh,r ∀t ∈ T,
(A.1) ⇒ qhg,t ≤ min{0, ηhg er,t} ∀r ∈ R ∀g ∈ Gsh,r ∀t ∈ T,
∵ ηhg ≥ 0 and er,t ≥ 0 ∀r ∈ R ∀g ∈ Gsh,r ∀t ∈ T,
⇒ ηhg er,t ≥ 0 ∀r ∈ R ∀g ∈ Gsh,r,
⇒ min{0, ηhg er,t} = 0 ∀r ∈ R ∀g ∈ Gsh,r ∀t ∈ T,
∴ right-hand side of (6.7) = (A.1)⇒
qhg,t ≤ 0 ∀r ∈ R ∀g ∈ Gsh,r ∀t ∈ T.
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Appendix B
Discussion of the Transition with Zero
Transition Time
When the transition time is zero in a CCU plant, there is no transition
ramping curves. Transitions between two configurations is shown in Fig. B.1.
Figure B.1: Illustration of transitions with zero transition time.
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For the units with zero transition time, the plant-wise ramping con-
straints (5.9) and (5.10) are valid with no need for alterations. However,
the constants A(y′, y) and Hy of those units with zero transition time in
configuration-wise ramping constraints (5.11) and (5.12) are changed.
Two conditions, namely CCU plant ramp up from configuration B to
A and CCU plant ramp down from configuration A to B shown in Fig. B.1,
are considered respectively in the calculation of A(y′, y):






< py, CCU ramp up
0, if py
′
> py, CCU ramp down
∀y′ ∈MT,y.
Hy = py ∀y. (B.2)
After the substitution, when a transition between configurations occurs,
the configuration-wise ramping constraints (5.11) and (5.12) applied on the
start up configuration are in two conditions:
• When the CCU ramps up (e.g. configuration A starts up when the





pyt ≥ py −R
y
D ∀t,∀y. (5.12’)
Constraint (5.11’) indicates that, due to the ramping constraints, the
maximum output of the start up configuration is its lower bound plus
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the ramp up rate. Constraint (5.12’) would limit the output of the
start up configuration to be greater than its lower bound minus the
ramp down rate. However, since the output of the configuration is
always greater than its lower bound, constraint (5.12’) would never
be active.
• When the CCU ramps down (e.g. configuration B starts up when





pyt ≥ py −R
y
D ∀t,∀y. (5.12”)
Constraint (5.12”) indicates that, due to the ramping constraints,
the minimum output of the start up configuration is its upper bound
minus the ramp down rate. Constraint (5.11”) would limit the output
of the start up configuration to be less than its upper bound plus the
ramp up rate. However, since the output of the configuration is
always less than its upper bound, constraint (5.11”) would never be
active.
After the substitution, when a transition between configurations occurs,
the configuration-wise ramping constraints (5.11) and (5.12) applied on the
shut down configuration become:
• Shut down configuration:
qyt−1 ≥ 0 ∀t,∀y. (5.11”)
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qyt−1 ≤ qy ∀t,∀y. (5.12”)
That is, when a configuration shuts down in a transition, constraints
(5.11”) and (5.12”) would never apply additional limits to the output
of the configuration.
Notice that, the transition data required for this calculation and sub-
stitution of the constants is available off-line. Therefore, the operation of sub-
stituting the constants of the unit with zero transition time will not impact
the formulation and computation in the optimization.
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Anjan Bose, Claudio Canizares, Nikos Hatziargyriou, David Hill, Alex
Stankovic, Carson Taylor, et al. Definition and classification of power
system stability ieee/cigre joint task force on stability terms and defini-
tions. IEEE transactions on Power Systems, 19(3):1387–1401, 2004.
[219] Alexis Kwasinski. Local energy storage as a decoupling mechanism for
interdependent infrastructures. In 2011 IEEE International Systems
Conference, pages 435–441. IEEE, April 2011.
[220] Leslie Lamport. LATEX: A document preparation system. Addison-
Wesley, 2nd edition, 1994.
[221] Eamonn Lannoye, Damian Flynn, and Mark O’Malley. The role of
power system flexibility in generation planning. In 2011 IEEE Power
and Energy Society General Meeting, pages 1–6. IEEE, July 2011.
200
[222] Eamonn Lannoye, Student Member Ieee, Damian Flynn, Senior Mem-
ber Ieee, Mark O Malley, and Fellow Ieee. Power System Flexibility
Assessment - State of the Art. 2012.
[223] Eamonn Lannoye, Student Member, Damian Flynn, Senior Member, and
Mark O Malley. Evaluation of Power System Flexibility. 27(2):922–931,
2012.
[224] A M Leite Da Silva, R A G Fernandez, and C Singh. Generating
Capacity Reliability Evaluation Based on Monte Carlo Simulation and
Cross-Entropy Methods. IEEE Trans. Power Syst., 25(1):129–137,
2010.
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continuum approach. PloS one, 8(3):e60069, January 2013.
[359] R. Sioshansi, R. O’Neill, and S.S. Oren. Economic Consequences of Al-
ternative Solution Methods for Centralized Unit Commitment in Day-
Ahead Electricity Markets. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,
23(2):344–352, 2008.
[360] Ramteen Sioshansi, Shmuel Oren, and Richard O’Neill. Three-part auc-
tions versus self-commitment in day-ahead electricity markets. Utilities
Policy, 18(4):165–173, 2010.
[361] Saleh Soltan, Prateek Mittal, and H Vincent Poor. Blackiot: Iot botnet
of high wattage devices can disrupt the power grid. In 27th {USENIX}
Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 18), pages 15–32, 2018.
[362] P.M. Sotkiewicz and J.M. Vignolo. Nodal Pricing for Distribution Net-
works: Efficient Pricing for Efficiency Enhancing DG. IEEE Transac-
tions on Power Systems, 21(2):1013–1014, May 2006.
220
[363] Southern California Edison. Demand Bidding Program.
[364] Michael Spivak. The joy of TEX. American Mathematical Society,
Providence, R.I., 2nd edition, 1990.
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[387] Lúıs N. Vicente and Paul H. Calamai. Bilevel and multilevel program-
ming: A bibliography review. Journal of Global Optimization, 5(3):291–
306, October 1994.
[388] Juan Pablo Vielma. Mixed Integer Linear Programming Formulation
Techniques. SIAM Review, 57(1):3–57, January 2015.
[389] V Visweswaran, C A Floudas, M G Ierapetritou, and E N Pistikopoulos.
A decomposition-based global optimization approach for solving bilevel
linear and quadratic programs. In State of the art in global optimization,
pages 139–162. Springer, 1996.
[390] Heinrich von Stackelberg. Market structure and equilibrium. Springer,
Berlin, Germany, 2011.
224
[391] Congcong Wang, Peter B. Luh, Paul Gribik, Tengshun Peng, and Li Zhang.
Commitment Cost Allocation of Fast-Start Units for Approximate Ex-
tended Locational Marginal Prices. IEEE Transactions on Power Sys-
tems, 2016.
[392] Congcong Wang, Tengshun Peng, Peter B. Luh, Paul Gribik, and Li Zhang.
The subgradient simplex cutting plane method for extended locational
marginal prices. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 28(3):2758–
2767, 2013.
[393] Gui Wang, Uday V. Shanbhag, Tongxin Zheng, Eugene Litvinov, and
Sean Meyn. An Extreme-Point Subdifferential Method for Convex Hull
Pricing in Energy and Reserve Markets—Part I: Algorithm Structure.
IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 28(3):2111–2120, 2013.
[394] Gui Wang, Uday V. Shanbhag, Tongxin Zheng, Eugene Litvinov, and
Sean Meyn. An Extreme-Point Subdifferential Method for Convex Hull
Pricing in Energy and Reserve Markets—Part II: Convergence Analysis
and Numerical Performance. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,
28(3):2121–2127, 2013.
[395] Lingfeng Wang and C Singh. Population-Based Intelligent Search in
Reliability Evaluation of Generation Systems With Wind Power Pene-
tration. IEEE Trans. Power Syst., 23(3):1336–1345, 2008.
[396] Yezhou Wang and Ross Baldick. Cascading outage analysis using se-
quential outage checkers. 2012.
225
[397] Yezhou Wang and Ross Baldick. Case study of an improved cascading
outage analysis model using outage checkers. In Power and Energy
Society General Meeting (PES), 2013 IEEE, pages 1–5. IEEE, 2013.
[398] Yezhou Wang and Ross Baldick. Interdiction analysis of electric grids
combining cascading outage and medium-term impacts. IEEE Transac-
tions on Power Systems, 29(5):2160–2168, 2014.
[399] Yu Wang, Zijun Cao, and Siu Kui Au. Practical reliability analysis of
slope stability by advanced Monte Carlo simulations in a spreadsheet.
Canadian Geotechnical Journal, 48(1):162–172, 2010.
[400] Zhi-Hua Wang, Elie Bou-Zeid, Siu Kui Au, and James A Smith. An-
alyzing the sensitivity of WRF’s single-layer urban canopy model to
parameter uncertainty using advanced Monte Carlo simulation. Journal
of Applied Meteorology and Climatology, 50(9):1795–1814, 2011.
[401] W Wangdee and R Billinton. Reliability-performance-index probability
distribution analysis of bulk electricity systems. Electrical and Com-
puter Engineering, Canadian Journal of, 30(4):189–193, 2005.
[402] W Wangdee and R Billinton. Bulk electric system well-being analysis
using sequential Monte Carlo simulation. IEEE Trans. Power Syst.,
21(1):188–193, 2006.
[403] Alan Washburn and R. Kevin Wood. Two-person zero-sum games for
network interdiction. Operations Research, 43(2):243–251, April 1995.
226
[404] Energy Information Administration; 2019. Washington, DC: US Depart-
ment of Energy. EIA - Electricity Data.
[405] H. Wei and X. Bai. Semi-definite programming-based method for
security-constrained unit commitment with operational and optimal power
flow constraints. IET Generation, Transmission & Distribution, 3(2):182–
197, February 2009.
[406] U.-P. Wen and Y.-H. Yang. Algorithms for solving the mixed integer
two-level linear programming problem. Computers & Operations Re-
search, 17(2):133–142, January 1990.
[407] Ue-Pyng Wen and Shuh-Tzy Hsu. Linear bi-level programming prob-
lems – a review. The Journal of the Operational Research Society,
42(2):125–133, February 1991.
[408] Young-Min Wi, Ji-Hui Kim, Sung-Kwan Joo, Jong-Bae Park, and Jae-
Chul Oh. Customer baseline load (CBL) calculation using exponen-
tial smoothing model with weather adjustment. In 2009 Transmission
& Distribution Conference & Exposition: Asia and Pacific, pages 1–4.
IEEE, October 2009.
[409] Wolfram Wiesemann, Angelos Tsoukalas, Polyxeni-Margarita Kleniati,
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A Multi-Scale Multi-City Study of Commuting Patterns Incorporating
Digital Traces. Submitted to PNAS, 2014.
[420] Maziar Yazdani Damavandi, Iman Kiaei, Mohamad Kazem Sheikh-El-
Eslami, and Hossein Seifi. New approach to gas network modeling in
unit commitment. Energy, 36(10):6243–6250, October 2011.
[421] Wang Yezhou. Security of Electric Power Systems: Cascading Outage
Analysis, Interdiction Model and Resilience to Natural Disasters. PhD
thesis, UT Austin, 2015.
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